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Non-Consensual Disclosures
Nina Varsava*
In the course of biomedical research on humans—for example,
flu, imaging, and genomic studies—researchers often uncover
information about participants that is important to their health
and wellbeing. In many cases, the information is not anticipated
in advance, and participants did not consent to receiving it. This
Article examines the law and policy governing human subjects
research, focusing on the set of regulations known as the
“Common Rule.” I argue that human subjects researchers will
often have strong ethical reasons to disclose results even when
participants did not consent to the disclosure in advance. I also
show how the current regulatory scheme stands in the way of
ethical disclosures, putting researchers in a difficult position
where they might not be able to fulfill their ethical duties without
transgressing legal ones. Although we need to contend with
autonomy and welfare risks associated with returning results, not
to mention financial and administrative costs, these downsides are
similarly present in analogous scenarios where non-consensual
warnings are legally permitted and sometimes even required.
There does not appear to be any good reason to make a policy
exception for biomedical researchers when it comes to issuing
warnings in the form of information disclosure. To aid difficult
determinations about which results warrant return, I suggest that
policymakers should take advantage of the interest and
willingness of the bioethics community to develop consensus
norms and incorporate these norms into regulations such that the
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regulations would at least permit researchers to disclose results
whenever consensus standards would recommend disclosure. In
this way, the law would make space for ethically optimal conduct
without necessarily compelling it. At the same time, bioethicists
and researchers should train their attention on non-ideal consent
settings—the focus of this Article—rather than continuing to
assume or hope that participants will have a chance to consent to
the disclosure of results in advance.
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INTRODUCTION
In the course of biomedical research on humans—for example,
flu, imaging, and genomic studies—researchers often uncover
information about participants that is important to their health and
wellbeing and sometimes even the wellbeing of others. In many
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cases, the information is not anticipated in advance, and
participants did not consent to receiving it.
When the first U.S. COVID-19 case appeared in Washington
state in late January of 2020, a group of researchers had already
been collecting nasal swab samples from Seattle-area residents for
months as part of the Seattle Flu Study, and they had thousands of
recent samples in their possession.1 Naturally, the researchers
wondered if they could learn something about COVID-19 and its
prevalence in the area by testing their samples for the virus. But the
researchers did not anticipate, at the time of collection, that they
would have reason to test their samples for the novel coronavirus.
Although their participants had consented to influenza testing—
the focus of the study—they had not consented to having their
samples tested for the coronavirus, nor to the disclosure of results
from any such testing, whether to themselves or public health
authorities.2 Moreover, the research team’s COVID-19 test had not
been approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and
their laboratory was not certified as a clinical laboratory under the
Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments (CLIA), a federal
regulation that requires labs conducting diagnostic testing to
acquire special certification.3
Aware of potential legal and ethical issues, the research team
attempted to get approval from federal and state officials to test their
samples for COVID-19, but officials declined to approve the plan.4
The researchers believed that they had an ethical duty to test their
samples for the virus, and the Study’s Institutional Review Board
1. Helen Y. Chu, Janet A. Englund, Lea M. Starita, Michael Famulare, Elisabeth
Brandstetter, Deborah A. Nickerson, Mark J. Rieder, Amanda Adler, Kirsten Lacombe,
Ashley E. Kim, Chelsey Graham, Jennifer Logue, Caitlin R. Wolf, Jessica Heimonen, Denise
J. McCulloch, Peter D. Han, Thomas R. Sibley, Jover Lee, Misja Ilcisin, Kairsten Fay, Roy
Burstein, Beth Martin, Christina M. Lockwood, Matthew Thompson, Barry Lutz, Michael
Jackson, James P. Hughes, Michael Boeckh, Jay Shendure & Trevor Bedford, Early Detection
of Covid-19 Through a Citywide Pandemic Surveillance Platform, 383 NEW ENG. J. MED. 185,
186 (2020); Gregory Conko, Regulation, Confusion, and the Irony of Emergency COVID-19
Testing, COMPETITIVE ENTER. INST. (Mar. 16, 2020), https://cei.org/blog/regulationconfusion-and-irony-emergency-covid-19-testing.
2. Chu et al., supra note 1; Sheri Fink & Mike Baker, ‘It’s Just Everywhere Already’: How
Delays in Testing Set Back the U.S. Coronavirus Response, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/10/us/coronavirus-testing-delays.html.
3. See Fink & Baker, supra note 2. For more on CLIA, see infra Section II.B.2.
4. See Fink & Baker, supra note 2; Michael Barbaro, Why the U.S. Wasn’t Ready for the
Coronavirus, N.Y. TIMES: THE DAILY (Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/03/11/podcasts/the-daily/coronavirus-us-testing.html.
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(IRB) agreed with that assessment. The researchers accordingly
proceeded with testing, despite the lack of agency permission.5
Many samples tested positive, and the team reported their findings
to public health officials and at least some participants.6
Information provided on the Flu Study’s website, however,
indicated that “[p]articipants who signed a consent form after
March 4 are eligible to receive COVID-19 results[,]” implying that
participants who did not sign a consent form after March 4 would
not receive such results.7 Presumably, this is because after March 4
the research team implemented revised consent materials that
included information about COVID testing. And, indeed,
regulators had apparently informed the researchers that they could
test for the virus and report results, but only for participants who
had consented to it.8
Regardless of the ethics of the researchers’ decision to test
existing samples for COVID-19 and share results, multiple
regulatory obstacles stood in their way. This Article focuses on key
regulatory provisions concerning informed consent and the
disclosure of individual results. The portion of the federal
regulations governing human subjects research known as the
“Common Rule” requires researchers to inform study participants,
at the consent stage, whether individual findings will be returned
to them.9 Although the Seattle Flu Study’s original consent
5. Fink & Baker, supra note 2.
6. Chu et al., supra note 1; Fink & Baker, supra note 2; Conko, supra note 1.
7. Leadership Update from the Seattle Flu Study, SEATTLE FLU STUDY,
https://wayback.archive-it.org/org-729/20200511225820/https:/seattleflue.org/scan (last
visited Oct. 2, 2021).
8. Fink & Baker, supra note 2 (reporting that “federal and state officials said the flu
study could not be repurposed because it did not have explicit permission from research
subjects[,]” and that officials later relented in part, allowing the researchers “to test cases and
report the results only in future samples[,]” provided that “they . . . use[d] a new consent
form that explicitly mentioned that results of the coronavirus tests might be shared”).
9. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(c)(8) (2020). The “Common Rule” refers specifically to Subpart
A of 45 C.F.R. § 46. Kayte Spector-Bagdady, Governing Secondary Research Use of Health Data
and Specimens: The Inequitable Distribution of Regulatory Burden Between Federally Funded and
Industry Research, 8 J. OF L. AND BIOSCIENCES 1, 9 (2021). The remaining Subparts (B–D)
provide “additional protections for vulnerable populations, such as children.” Id. The
Common Rule generally applies to federally funded research involving human subjects. 45
C.F.R. § 46.101. Many research entities, however, adopt Common Rule requirements for all
human subjects research, regardless of funding source. Protecting Research Volunteers: Is All
Human Subjects Research Regulated, OFF. FOR HUM. RSCH. PROTS., https://www.hhs.gov/
ohrp/education-and-outreach/about-research-participation/protecting-research-volunteers/
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materials likely included provisions about the return of regular flu
test results, those materials naturally did not inform participants
that novel coronavirus results might be returned to them or public
health authorities. Arguably, then, the consent materials did not
support the return of those results to anyone, and the researchers
violated the Common Rule when they disclosed them.
Legal issues aside, the Seattle Flu Study case would seem to be
an easy one in terms of ethics. Once it became apparent that the
virus was spreading in the United States, the flu researchers were
ethically permitted, and possibly even required, to test their
samples for COVID-19 and report the results. This testing and
reporting could serve to mitigate a public health crisis, because
information about infected individuals could help public health
officials as well as affected individuals themselves track their
contacts and limit further transmission. As the Study’s research
team explains, “[t]he first COVID-19 case detected through the
Seattle Flu Study . . . was the first documented U.S. case of
community transmission at the time”; the Study’s COVID-19
testing “initiated assessment of the spread of the virus in the Seattle
region, which in turn accelerated public health efforts to mitigate
the emerging pandemic.”10
Individuals who received positive test results could also act on
the information in ways that would benefit them—by taking
measures to protect their loved ones and community members
from infection, for example, and by preparing for possible medical
interventions, including hospitalization. The advantages of testing
samples for COVID-19 and reporting results were exacerbated by
the fact that the United States had been notoriously lethargic in its
testing efforts. Given the limited availability of testing, especially in
other-research/index.html (last reviewed Jan. 28, 2020) (stating that, “many institutions
voluntarily apply the protections laid out in the Common Rule”). See, e.g., The
Common Rule, U.C. D AVIS O FFICE OF R SCH., https://research.ucdavis.edu/
policiescompliance/irb-admin/researchers/project-guidance/federal-funding/ (last
visited Oct. 15, 2021) (requiring that all studies, regardless of funding source, comply with
certain Common Rule requirements); Institutional Review Board Human Research
Protections: 2018 Common Rule Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), UCI OFF. OF RSCH. 1, 2 (Jan.
25,
2019),
https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:ZCY2rV7AFfkJ:
https://research.uci.edu/compliance/human-research-protections/researchers/2018common-rule-faqs.pdf+&cd=19&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us&client=firefox-b-1-d (requiring that
“[a]ll studies approved by the IRB on or after January 21, 2019 must transition [to new
regulatory requirements] regardless of funding.”).
10. Chu et al., supra note 1.
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the early weeks of the pandemic in the United States, many
individuals were effectively denied access to COVID tests.11
The downsides of running COVID-19 tests on samples that
were originally collected for different purposes pale in comparison
to the benefits. Perhaps some individuals would rather not know
that they had or have the coronavirus—for example, because they
might be ordered to quarantine, depending on when the sample
was collected, or because of stigma associated with testing positive.
Another risk of informing participants of the results of a test to
which they did not consent is the possibility of damaging public
trust in biomedical research and perhaps even the health care
system. Given the major advantages to testing existing Flu Study
samples for COVID-19 and reporting the results, though, the
researchers’ decision to do so would seem to be ethically sound.
One might accept this ethical evaluation of the Flu Study team’s
decision to test their samples for COVID-19 and report results, and
still insist that a general rule against disclosing medical results
without advanced consent is appropriate. One might think that the
pandemic posed an anomalous exception to the rule. This Article
argues, to the contrary, that human subjects researchers will often
have strong ethical reasons to disclose results to participants even
when those participants did not consent to the disclosure in
advance, and not only in the context of a public-health emergency.

11. Michael D. Shear, Abby Goodnough, Sheila Kaplan, Sheri Fink, Katie Thomas &
Noah Weiland, The Lost Month: How a Failure to Test Blinded the U.S. to Covid-19, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar.
28,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/28/us/testing-coronaviruspandemic.html (reporting that, as COVID-19 spread “across the United States between late
January and early March, large-scale testing of people who might have been infected did not
happen—because of technical flaws, regulatory hurdles, business-as-usual bureaucracies
and lack of leadership at multiple levels,” and that even in late March, many U.S. residents
did not have access to testing and “hospitals and clinics across the country [had to] deny
tests to those with milder symptoms, trying to save them for the most serious cases, and they
often wait a week for results” ); Denise M. Dudzinski, Benjamin Y. Hoisington & Crystal E.
Brown, Ethics Lessons from Seattle’s Early Experience with COVID-19, 20 AM. J. BIOETHICS 67, 69
(2020) (“Flaws in the [CDC] testing kits, unnecessary delays in the [FDA’s] approval of [the
University of Washington’s] test, and insufficient national testing capability created
a perfect storm when [COVID-19] landed in Seattle.”); Andrew Hay, Washington State
Urges Patience as Covid-19 Test Delays Stoke Anger, REUTERS (Mar. 4, 2020),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-usa-tests/washington-stateurges-patience-as-covid-19-test-delays-stoke-anger-idUSKBN20S096 (“Washington state
officials urged patience [in early March] as medical staff reported fear and anger among
people told they could not be tested for the coronavirus due to limited capacity in a state
facing the United States’ deadliest outbreak.”).
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The current regulatory scheme, however, imposes obstacles to
ethical disclosures. To this extent, the law conflicts with bioethics,
putting researchers in a difficult position, where they might not be
able to fulfill their ethical duties without transgressing legal ones.
A large body of bioethics literature, developed mainly over the
past twenty years, focuses on whether and under what
circumstances research participants have a right to receive
individual results. Bioethicists widely agree that researchers should
address the question of returning individual results at the consent
stage. And their conclusions generally rest on the premise that
researchers have done so. According to the consensus view,
researchers should return individual results under certain
conditions, provided that participants consented to the return of
results in advance of the study.12
But the literature has largely evaded the more difficult questions
of whether and under what conditions researchers should return
results even if participants have not consented to the disclosure—
which can happen if the consent form indicated that results would
not be disclosed, the form was silent or ambiguous on the matter, or
participants did not consent to participate in the research at all.
Although I agree with the consensus view that ideally consenting
participants would be informed upfront that certain findings will be
disclosed to them, the reality is that, for various reasons—some of
them morally acceptable and others not—participants often are not
so informed.13 The Seattle Flu Study, where participants were
recruited for one purpose but then their biospecimens were used for
another, is just one example. And so we need to grapple with the
question of the disclosure of individual results in non-ideal consent
settings. This is a matter of pressing, and increasing, importance, as
biomedical studies with human participants, on which the health
and wellbeing of society depend, proliferate. We have to ask not only
what these participants can do for research, but what research can
do for them, especially when the research might infringe on their
rights and threaten their interests.
Researchers often uncover individual, health-relevant
findings—for example, a genetic abnormality that indicates an
increased probability of developing a life-threatening disease—in
12. For a discussion of this literature, see infra Section II.A.
13. See infra Section II.C.
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the course of their studies. Currently, the regulations impose no
requirements on researchers to share such results, and actually
create obstacles to disclosure in various scenarios, thus making it
less likely that researchers will disclose individual findings. Other
legal provisions create further obstacles to that effect.
Although the context of a public health emergency made the
return of results in the Seattle Flu Study case particularly important
and urgent, even in the absence of any public health crisis
researchers will often have strong ethical reasons to return
individual results that are relevant to participants’ health and the
health of others—even if participants did not give their informed
consent to the disclosure in advance. To support this claim, I
develop analogies to other situations where experts have special
access to information that is relevant to the health and wellbeing of
others and where it is more widely accepted and apparently
intuitive that the experts have moral reasons, and in some cases
even legal ones, to share the information with those likely to be
affected by it. There is no good reason to make an exception for
human subjects researchers when it comes to the disclosure of
information. To the extent that the law reflects such an exception, it
promotes ethically problematic conduct and undermines the rights
and interests of research participants.
I argue further that the ethical reasons in favor of returning
results can be even stronger in the context of non-consensual, as
opposed to consensual, research. This is because researchers
infringe on the rights of those whom they engage in research
without consent, and they therefore owe non-consensual
participants greater care and compensation in return. My analysis
shows that prevailing theories about the ethics of returning results,
which ground any duties to disclose in the consent process, are at
best incomplete and at worst entirely misdirected. I focus on
genomic research on humans, since this is a common setting for the
discovery of individual, health-relevant findings, but my
conclusions extend to other types of biomedical research as well,
including flu studies and imaging studies.
For the good of both society and participants to research, the
law should, at the least, permit investigators to return certain
individual findings to those affected by them—certainly in public
health emergencies such as the outbreak of COVID-19 in the United
States, but also under normal circumstances. The COVID-19
226
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example shows how high and urgent the stakes can be but should
not be seen or treated as an exception to a rule against returning
individual results. Bioethicists, biomedical researchers, legal
scholars, and other experts and stakeholders should turn their
attention to non-ideal consent settings and develop consensus norms
regarding which types of finding warrant return in these settings.
This Article lays the groundwork for that project. I suggest that
policymakers should take advantage of the willingness and interest
on the part of the bioethics community to develop and disseminate
consensus norms, through the regulatory incorporation of the
standards that develop, at least to the extent of permitting the return
of results whenever the consensus view recommends disclosure.
Researchers should at least be legally permitted to disclose results
when that disclosure is ethically advisable.
The Article proceeds as follows. In Part, I describe the concept of
health-relevant individual results and explain their informational
value. In Part II, I show how existing arguments in favor of duties to
return individual results in human subjects research generally
presuppose an ideal consent backdrop and thus evade the critical
question of how researchers should handle individual results in nonideal consent settings. I show further how the statutes and
regulations governing human subjects research invite investigators
to refrain from disclosing results and even create barriers to doing
so. In Part III, I argue that the return of results, under certain
conditions, is morally desirable and that this is the case even, and
indeed sometimes especially, if participants did not consent to
disclosure in advance. I show moreover how judicial decisions have
absorbed ethical principles and intuitions and recognized duties to
warn in analogous contexts. And finally, I propose a path for
regulatory reform that would take advantage of consensus standards
developed by bioethicists and other relevant professionals, and that
would recognize the rights and interests of participants who
contribute to research under non-ideal consent conditions.
I. HEALTH-RELEVANT RESULTS AND THEIR VALUE
I will argue that the law generally should not prevent or
discourage researchers from disclosing individual health-relevant
results to their participants. In this Part, I offer a rough definition of
health-relevant results, recognizing that the bioethics community
will need to work out further details.
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A. What is a Health-Relevant Result?
An individual health-relevant result is a finding about a
particular participant that researchers uncover in the course of
research and that is significant to the health or wellbeing of the
participant.14 Individual results are only health relevant if they are
reasonably trustworthy or “analytically valid.”15 Of course,
findings are never one hundred percent reliable. They are subject
to multiple types of error, including basic human errors in reading
and recording. As long as a result conveys substantially more signal
than noise, though, it can help inform an individual’s health-related
decisions. Moreover, the level of analytic validity required to make
an individual result health relevant depends on the extent to which
individuals have reasonable access to further testing that would
yield more certain results.16
The likelihood that human subjects researchers will discover
health-relevant individual findings depends on the nature of the
research. For example, in the case of the Seattle Flu Study, the
researchers would be unlikely to discover any findings aside from
the flu test results and then the COVID-19 results once they subjected
the samples to COVID testing. Many studies are highly targeted and
the set of individual results that might be uncovered is narrow.
Other studies, however—for example, some imaging studies and
genetic sequencing studies—have the potential to uncover a wide
range of health-relevant results about participants.17 As Ben Chan
14. Sharon Terry highlights the tension between “usefulness from the participant
perspective” and “clinical utility,” and discusses possibilities for managing this tension in
the context of decision making about what kinds of result warrant return. Sharon F. Terry,
The Tension Between Policy and Practice in Returning Research Results and Incidental Findings in
Genomic Biobank Research, 13 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 691, 709–11 (2012).
15. See Richard R. Fabsitz, Amy McGuire, Richard R. Sharp, Mona Puggal, Laura M.
Beskow, Leslie G. Biesecker, Ebony Bookman, Wylie Burke, Esteban Gonzalez Burchard,
George Church, Ellen Wright Clayton, John H. Eckfeldt, Conrad V. Fernandez, Rebecca
Fisher, Stephanie M. Fullerton, Stacey Gabriel, Francine Gachupin, Cynthia James, Gail P.
Jarvik, Rick Kittles, Jennifer R. Leib, Christopher O’Donnell, P. Pearl O’Rourke, Laura Lyman
Rodriguez, Sheri D. Schully, Alan R. Shuldiner, Rebecca K.F. Sze, Joseph V. Thakuria, Susan
M. Wolf & Gregory L. Burke, Ethical and Practical Guidelines for Reporting Research Results to
Study Participants: Updated Guidelines from a National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute Working
Group, 3 CIRCULATION & CARDIOVASCULAR GENETICS 574, 575 (2010) (suggesting that
individual results must be analytically valid to warrant return).
16. See infra note 30 on related justice concerns.
17. For example, neuroimaging studies uncover incidental findings “in up to fortyseven percent of supposedly normal adult control research participants,” and “colonography
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and coauthors observe, when researchers use whole exome- or
genome‑sequencing technologies, they will “nearly inevitabl[y
uncover] . . . some actionable variations . . . for every research
participant.”18 This is because such sequencing typically turns up
tens of thousands of genetic variants for each participant, some of
which will be “associated with a significant increase in risk of
disease for the proband [participant or donor] and [their]
relatives.”19 As genetics and medicine advance, opportunities for
researchers to uncover information about the health of participants
are continually increasing.20
Bioethicists often distinguish among “primary,” “secondary,”
and “incidental” or “collateral” findings.21 Primary findings are
results that the researchers are looking for directly and that are
generated to answer the main research questions; secondary
findings are also directly sought, but they do not answer the main
research questions; and incidental findings are results that are
uncovered unintentionally in the course of research. For an
example of the latter, a study of heart function might involve
imaging of the torso region that reveals abnormalities, such as
tumors, in organs that are not directly under study.22 On my
reveals extracolonic findings in about half of scans in asymptomatic participant
populations.” Susan M. Wolf, Jordan Paradise & Charlisse Caga-anan, The Law of Incidental
Findings in Human Subjects Research: Establishing Researchers’ Duties, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS
361, 362 (2008) [hereinafter Law of Incidental Findings].
18. Ben Chan, Flavia M. Facio, Haley Eidem, Sara Chandros Hull, Leslie G. Biesecker
& Benjamin E. Berkman, Genomic Inheritances: Disclosing Individual Research Results from
Whole-Exome Sequencing to Deceased Participants’ Relatives, 12 AM. J. BIOETHICS 1, 2 (2012).
19. Id.
20. See, e.g., Valerie Gutmann Koch, A Private Right of Action for Informed Consent in
Research, 45 SETON HALL L. REV. 173, 175 (2015) (“[W]ith almost daily genetic and medical
discoveries, there is an ever-increasing possibility of finding out information about the
research participant that is beyond the scope of the protocol.”).
21. See, e.g., Stephanie R. Morain, Kevin Weinfurt, Juli Bollinger, Gail Geller, Debra JH
Mathews & Jeremy Sugarman, Ethics and Collateral Findings in Pragmatic Clinical Trials, 20
AM. J. BIOETHICS. 6 (2020) (presenting a framework for analyzing whether researchers have
a duty to return individual collateral findings in the context of pragmatic clinical trials).
22. As Susan M. Wolf, Frances P. Lawrenz, Charles A. Nelson, Jeffrey P. Kahn,
Mildred K. Cho, Ellen Wright Clayton, Joel G. Fletcher, Michael K. Georgieff, Dale
Hammerschmidt, Kathy Hudson, Judy Illes, Vivek Kapur, Moira A. Keane, Barbara A.
Koenig, Bonnie S. LeRoy, Elizabeth G. McFarland, Jordan Paradise, Lisa S. Parker, Sharon F.
Terry, Brian Van Ness & Benjamin S. Wilfond , Managing Incidental Findings in Human Subjects
Research: Analysis and Recommendations, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 219, 228 (2008) [hereinafter
Managing Incidental Findings], explain, “The risk of [incidental findings] is intrinsic to
research generating any information beyond the variables directly under study.”
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analysis, however, whether the finding is primary, secondary, or
incidental typically makes little difference to the ethics of returning
it; accordingly, with some qualifications, I do not treat the different
types of finding separately.
An individual research finding can be health relevant in at least
two different ways. First, a result is health relevant if, based on that
finding, the individual would know that they have a substantial
chance of developing a serious disease.23 The result would be more
health relevant if it is actionable—that is, if the individual could
take actions to mitigate or prevent the development of the disease.24
For example, the discovery that an individual has one of the
breast‑cancer genes (BRCA1 or BRCA2) is health relevant in this
way. A positive BRCA1 or BRCA2 test indicates a substantial
chance of developing a life-threatening form of breast cancer.25
Moreover, an individual can significantly reduce that risk by
undergoing preventive surgery.26 A finding might be health

23. Other commentators have similarly suggested that results must meet this kind of
minimum requirement in order to warrant return. See, e.g., Fabsitz et al., supra note 15, at 575
(reporting that their working group recommended that results be returned if (among other
conditions) they have “important health implications . . . and the associated risks are
established and substantial”); Stephanie A. Alessi, The Return of Results in Genetic Testing: Who
Owes What to Whom, When, and Why?, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 1697, 1722 (2013) (arguing that
“researchers should have a legal duty to offer to disclose certain results that present a serious
and foreseeable harm”). Scholars have been reluctant to quantify the appropriate risk threshold.
Perhaps the appropriate threshold should depend on the severity of the disease at issue.
24. As others have noted, “the evidence base for ‘actionability’ of results will change
[most likely grow] over time and the number of such results will also increase . . . .” Yvonne
Bombard, Kenneth Offit & Mark E. Robson, Risks to Relatives in Genomic Research: A Duty to
Warn?, 12 AM. J. BIOETHICS 12, 13 (2012).
25. See, e.g., Karoline B. Kuchenbaecker, John L. Hopper, Daniel R. Barnes, Kelly-Anne
Phillips, Thea M. Mooij, Marie-José Roos-Blom, Sarah Jervis, Flora E. van Leeuwen, Roger L.
Milne, Nadine Andrieu, David E. Goldgar, Mary Beth Terry, Matti A. Rookus, Douglas F.
Easton, Antonis C. Antoniou & the BRCA1 and BRCA2 Cohort Consortium, Risks of Breast,
Ovarian, and Contralateral Breast Cancer for BRCA1 and BRCA2 Mutation Carriers, 317 JAMA
2402, 2410, 2412 (2017) (finding, based on a study of BRCA1 and BRCA2 carriers, that “the
cumulative risk of developing breast cancer by age 80 years was 72% for BRCA1 mutation
carriers and 69% for BRCA2 mutation carriers, respectively,” but noting that, since the study
participants “included women who, on average, are likely to have stronger family history of
cancer compared with mutation carriers identified through population-based sampling,” the
risks for carriers who do not have a family history of cancer might be lower).
26. What To Do If You’ve Tested Positive, NAT’L BREAST CANCER FOUND., INC.,
https://www.nationalbreastcancer.org/what-to-do-if-youve-tested-positive (last visited
Sept. 28, 2021) (explaining that preventive surgeries decrease the risk of breast cancer by
ninety percent); Medical Options for Women with BRCA1 and BRCA2 Mutations, CTRS. DISEASE
CONTROL AND PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/genomics/disease/breast_ovarian_
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relevant, however, even if the affected individual could not take any
measures to reduce the risk or severity of the disease.27 This is
because the result could provide information about one’s future
health that might affect one’s life decisions. For example, one might
decide to change certain life plans, both major—such as what kind of
family to have—and minor—such as when to travel or pursue
certain activities.
Second, a result is health relevant if it is likely to affect an
individual’s reproductive decisions. For example, if someone
learns that they are a carrier of the gene for cystic fibrosis (a
recessive disorder), that knowledge might inform decisions around
reproduction, such as whether their partner should be tested for the
CF gene and whether they will have a diagnostic fetal test for CF
during pregnancy. If both parents are carriers, then there is a
twenty-five percent chance that their child will develop cystic
fibrosis and a fifty percent chance that their child will be a carrier.28
Positive results for other genetic variations, such as the gene for
Huntington’s disease (a late-onset, dominant disorder, with
high‑penetrance) might likewise affect reproductive decisions.29
One could disagree to some extent with my conception of a
health-relevant result and still accept my broader argument about
the return of results. One might agree that, under certain
cancer/medical_options.htm (asserting that mastectomy is the most effective form of cancer
prevention) (last visited Sept. 28, 2021).
27. Others have argued that individual results should not be returned unless the result
is “actionable” in the sense that “there are established therapeutic or preventive
interventions . . . that have the potential to change the clinical course of the disease.” Fabsitz
et al., supra note 15, at 575. I disagree with this limitation because individuals might make
meaningful decisions in light of certain results, which create value in their lives, even if those
decisions do not involve medical interventions. An example of a result that is not health
relevant on my view is evidence of mild cognitive impairment (MCI): as Lisa Parker explains,
“[T]he clinical utility of a MCI diagnosis has not been established. . . . its diagnostic criteria
are not consistently utilized, and relevant clinical communities cannot agree on the
meaningulness of a finding of MCI.” Lisa S. Parker, The Future of Incidental Findings: Should
They Be Viewed as Benefits?, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 341, 348 (2008).
28. Carrier
Testing
for
Cystic
Fibrosis,
CYSTIC
FIBROSIS
FOUND.,
https://www.cff.org/What-is-CF/Testing/Carrier-Testing-for-Cystic-Fibrosis/
(last
visited Sept. 28, 2021).
29. If an individual tests positive for the Huntington’s gene, then it is almost certain
that they will develop the disease. See The Genetics of Huntington’s Disease, HUNTINGTON’S
DISEASE
ASS’N,
https://www.hda.org.uk/huntingtons-disease/what-is-huntingtonsdisease/genetics-of-huntingtons-disease (last visited Sept. 28, 2021). If one parent has the
gene a child has a fifty-percent chance of inheriting it, and if both parents have the gene a
child has a seventy-five percent chance of inheriting it. Id.
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circumstances, it is appropriate for researchers to return individual
results to participants, while believing that the universe of
health‑relevant results is bigger or smaller or just different than the
universe that I envision. In any event, it is undeniable that
researchers uncover some individual results in the course of
research with human subjects that are significantly relevant to
participant wellbeing. This Article argues that, on moral grounds,
returning such results will often be praiseworthy if not obligatory,
and that law and policy are therefore defective insofar as they stand
in the way of disclosure.
B. The Value of Health-Relevant Results
As various commentators have suggested, individual results
that researchers uncover—whether primary, secondary, or
incidental—can be highly valuable to participants for a variety of
reasons. Disclosing results supports individual autonomy because
it gives individuals the opportunity to make informed decisions
about their healthcare and to plan for the future.30 An individual’s
autonomy might be substantially curtailed if they are blindsided by
the effects of a disease, whether in themselves or their children.
And receiving forewarning in the form of individual results from a
research study can help to prevent that eventuality. Armed with
the information that researchers provide by returning findings,
individuals might be able to take actions to mitigate or even
prevent disease, or at least to plan ahead for the eventuality of
developing a disease. 31
30. Individuals without access to healthcare, however, will have more limited options.
They may not be able to obtain further testing, preventive care, or treatment. People will also
have different capacities to process and comprehend the information disclosed to them,
disparities which have to be taken into account when considering the best disclosure
processes to adopt. See, e.g., Terry, supra note 14, at 721 (asserting that people “with different
levels of literacy will require different levels of support, which will require varying methods
of education and a sundry of follow-up activities”). These represent critical distributive
justice issues which have to be worked out, but which I set aside for now.
31. Various diseases are fatal if diagnosed late but can be cured if diagnosed early or
prevented if the risk of disease is identified before symptoms materialize. An example is
medullary thyroid carcinoma (MTC), which is associated with a genetic abnormality in
twenty-five percent of cases. See Medullary Thyroid Cancer, AM. THYROID ASS’N,
https://www.thyroid.org/medullary-thyroid-cancer/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2021). The
prognosis of MTC is highly dependent on how early it is diagnosed; it can be cured with
surgery if diagnosed early, but the prognosis is poor if diagnosed late. Id. Another example
is long QT syndrome, which causes sudden cardiac death, but can be treated to decrease the
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Some of the options available to an individual who discovers
their risk factor before symptoms develop will be foreclosed once the
disease materializes. And, assuming that people will act in their own
best interests, disclosing results promotes not only autonomy but
also well-being. A multidisciplinary group of twelve scholars has
argued in favor of a duty to return findings “based on researcher
obligations to respect subjects’ autonomy and interests . . . .”32
Of course, there are also non-trivial risks associated with
learning information about one’s current or future health. The
result might contribute to anxiety and depression. The result might
be misleading, and the recipient might unnecessarily change life
plans in response to it. As I argue below, however, the risks
associated with information disclosure in this context are not
unique and do not justify special prohibitions or restrictions on
returning individual research results.33
The question of exactly which results should be returned is
beyond the scope of this Article. As I suggest below, the bioethics
community should work to develop guidance, on which
policymakers and enforcers can rely, concerning which results
qualify as “health-relevant” such that they warrant disclosure even
if consent for the disclosure was not initially obtained.34
II. CONSENT AND THE RETURN OF RESULTS
In this Part, I review the literature, the law and policy, and the
practice of the return of individual, health-relevant results to
research participants. First, I draw attention to the prevalence of
published guidance from bioethicists and researchers on the topic
risk of cardiac death if detected in time. Anneke Lucassen & Michael Parker, Confidentiality
and Sharing Genetic Information with Relatives, 375 LANCET 1507, 1508 (2010). As D’Auffriet Van
Haecke and de Montgolfier explain, “[t]he utility of knowing” that one has an increased risk
for a certain disease—for example, types of cancer and metabolic illnesses—is that “there are
screening options or preventive therapies that can forestall the onset of the disorder or
improve individual prognosis, and in some cases even prevent death.” Diane d’ Audiffret
Van Haecke & Sandrine de Montgolfier, Genetic Test Results and Disclosure to Family Members:
Qualitative Interviews of Healthcare Professionals’ Perceptions of Ethical and Professional Issues in
France, 25 J. GENETIC COUNSELING 483, 483 (2016).
32. Judy Illes, Matthew P. Kirschen, Emmeline Edwards, L R. Stanford, Peter Bandettini,
Mildred K. Cho, Paul J. Ford, Gary H. Glover, Jennifer Kulynych, Ruth Macklin, Daniel B.
Michael, Susan M. Wolf & members of the Working Group on Incidental Findings in Brain
Imaging Research, Incidental Findings in Brain Imaging Research, 311 SCI. 783, 783 (2006).
33. See infra Part III.
34. See infra Section III.G.
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of the return of results, and in particular efforts to develop and
disseminate consensus norms or standards, and I point out a
fundamental limitation with this literature—existing theories about
the ethics of returning results ground reasons to return in
participants’ voluntary consent to research and thus neglect the
rights and interests of non-consensual research participants.
Second, I explain how the law governing human subjects research
creates incentives for researchers to refrain from obtaining consent
to the return of results in advance and in turn to refrain from
returning results. And third, I observe that researchers often choose
not to return results despite empirical evidence suggesting that
participants wish to receive them.
A. The Literature
Bioethicists and human subjects researchers have produced a
wealth of literature on consent and the return of results, often as
part of large, multi-disciplinary collaborations. They generally
argue that, in the context of consensual human subjects research,
researchers have some, although limited, ethical duties to return
individual health-relevant results, and that researchers should
inform participants about the return of results as part of the
informed consent process. This is perhaps the prevailing or
consensus view.35 According to Rebecca Branum and Susan Wolf,
“there is wide agreement that investigators have a responsibility
to anticipate discovery of findings that may warrant return, to
incorporate in protocols a plan for evaluating such findings, and
to offer at least some of these results to participants consenting to

35. See, e.g., Matthew P. Gordon, A Legal Duty to Disclose Individual Research Findings
to Research Subjects?, 64 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 225, 235 (2009) ( “[I]n situations where the research
finding would have significant clinical utility to the subject, there appears to be broad
agreement, based in large part on the principle of respect for persons, that there is a moral
obligation to disclose.”); William McGeveran, Leili Fatehi & Pari McGarraugh,
Deidentification and Reidentification in Returning Individual Findings from Biobank and Secondary
Research: Regulatory Challenges and Models for Management, 13 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 485, 524
(2012) (recognizing “a growing belief that researchers should return individual findings in
at least some situations”); Emily Scholtes, Incorporating Cost into the Return of Incidental
Findings Calculus: Defining a Responsible Default for Genetics and Genomics Researchers, 100
MINN. L. REV. 1171, 1192 (2016) (“While returning nothing may seem advantageous because
it minimizes the cost and burden of interpreting and returning incidental findings, most
researchers have rejected this approach as being ethically unsupportable.”).
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such return.”36 Scholars ground duties to return results to
participants in principles of gratitude, reciprocity, and autonomy.37
A minority of commentators, however, insists that researchers do
not have any obligation to return individual results, since the return
of results amounts to a kind of clinical care, which is beyond the scope
of the researcher-participant relationship.38 Moreover, it will often be
costly and impracticable for researchers to recontact participants
when important health-related findings are discovered.39
Despite some differences in opinion about whether researchers
have ethical duties to return results, commentators widely agree that
researchers should inform participants, through the consent process,
about the possibility of uncovering individual results and whether
or not such results will be returned to participants.40 Those in favor

36. Rebecca Branum & Susan M. Wolf, International Policies on Sharing Genomic
Research Results with Relatives: Approaches to Balancing Privacy with Access, 43 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 576, 576 (2015).
37. For arguments that explain duties to return in these terms, see infra Section II.A.1.
38. See, e.g., Ellen Wright Clayton & Amy L. McGuire, The Legal Risks of Returning
Results of Genomic Research, 14 GENETIC MED. 473, 475 (2012) ( “If there is some sort of
notification or consent, it may state explicitly that individual results will not be returned due
in part to the difficulties return presents.”); Susan M. Wolf, The Role of Law in the Debate over
Return of Research Results and Incidental Findings: The Challenge of Developing Law for
Translational Science, 13 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 435, 443–44 (2012) (explaining that, “[t]he
researcher has been seen as owing limited duties to the individual research participants, in
contrast to the clinician, who undertakes a broad duty of care towards the individual patient”
and that, “the return of results debate . . . forces us to rethink the traditional wall between
research and clinical care . . . .”); Terry, supra note 14, at 719 (“Researchers, while in a gray
area of interaction with participants, unlike clinicians, do not take a Hippocratic Oath and
have no formal clinical professional codes of conduct.”).
39. See, e.g., Clayton & McGuire, supra note 38, at 476 (while there may be
exceptional “cases in which disclosure of research results should be encouraged, . . .
[g]reat caution should be taken to ensure that these exceptions are not generalized to
create a rule requiring disclosure, especially for results generated distant in place and
particularly in time from data collection.”).
40. See, e.g., Gail E. Henderson, Susan M. Wolf, Kristine J. Kuczynski, Steven Joffe,
Richard R. Sharp, D. Williams Parsons, Bartha M. Knoppers, Joon-Ho Yu & Paul S.
Appelbaum, The Challenge of Informed Consent and Return of Results in Translational
Genomics: Empirical Analysis and Recommendations, 42 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 344, 354 (2014)
(proposing a list of information about the return of results that participants should receive
during the consent process, including a description of “possible results related to
diagnostic or incidental findings” that might be uncovered, as well as a statement of “the
likelihood of producing such results” and “whether they are related to conditions that are
preventable [or] treatable . . .”); Bartha Maria Knoppers, Yann Joly, Jacques Simard &
Francine Durocher, The Emergence of an Ethical Duty to Disclose Genetic Research Results:
International Perspectives, 14 EUR. J. HUM. GENETIC 1170, 1176 (2006) (asserting that “the
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of the return of results insist that the return of results “should be
offered as part of the original consent process and re-offered at the
conclusion of the study.”41 The Canadian Tri-Council Policy
Statement on Ethical Conduct for Research Involving Humans
provides that “researchers shall inform participants, as part of the
initial consent process, of the likelihood of discovering material
incidental findings, and where applicable, should provide
information on their strategy to disclose such findings to
participants.”42 On the other side are those who deny that

issue of notifying (or not) participants of results should be disclosed and agreed to in
advance (ie [sic] on the consent form)”).
41. Conrad V. Fernandez, Eric Kodish & Charles Weijer, Informing Study Participants
of Research Results: An Ethical Imperative, 25 IRB: ETHICS & HUM. RSCH. 12, 15 (2003); see also
Managing Incidental Findings, supra note 22, at 238, 227 (arguing that researchers should offer
to return results of “Strong Net Benefit” to participants and should “address the possibility
of discovering [such findings] in their consent forms and communications with . . .
participants.”); Timothy Caulfield, Amy L. McGuire, Mildred Cho, Janet A. Buchanan,
Michael M. Burgess, Ursula Danilczyk, Christina M. Diaz, Kelly Fryer-Edwards, Shane K.
Green, Marc A. Hodosh, Eric T. Juengst, Jane Kaye, Laurence Kedes, Bartha Maria Knoppers,
Trudo Lemmens, Eric M. Meslin, Juli Murphy, Robert L. Nussbaum, Margaret Otlowski,
Daryl Pullman, Peter N. Ray, Jeremy Sugarman & Michael Timmons, Research Ethics
Recommendations for Whole-Genome Research: Consensus Statement, 6 PLOS BIOLOGY 430, 433
(2008) (arguing that researchers should inform participants, “in the initial consent
[materials],” what types of individual results will be returned to them); Gaile Renegar,
Christopher J. Webster, Steffen Stuerzebecher, Lea Harty, Susan E. Ide, Beth Balkite, Taryn
A. Rogalski-Slater, Nadine Cohen, Brian B. Spear, Diane M. Barnes & Celia Brazell, Returning
Genetic Research Results to Individuals: Points-to-Consider, 20 BIOETHICS 24, 35 (2006) (arguing
that researchers should ask participants whether they want to receive results at the
enrollment stage and ask participants again before sharing findings).
42. CAN. INSTS. OF HEALTH RSCH., NAT. SCIS. AND ENG’G RSCH. COUNCIL OF CAN. &
SOC. SCIS. AND HUMANS. RSCH. COUNCIL OF CAN., TRI-COUNCIL POLICY STATEMENT, ETHICAL
CONDUCT FOR RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMANS 34 (TCPS2 2018), https://ethics.gc.ca/
eng/documents/tcps2-2018-en-interactive-final.pdf; see also GENEVA: COUNCIL FOR INT’L
ORGS. OF MED. SCIS., INTERNATIONAL ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR HEALTH‑RELATED RESEARCH
INVOLVING HUMANS 103 (4th ed. 2016) (providing that researchers must inform participants
in the consent materials that they “will be informed of life-saving information and data of
immediate clinical utility involving a significant health problem”); Comité de Ética del
Instituto de Investigación de Enfermedades Raras (IIER), Inst. De Salud Carlos III. Madrid,
Moisés Abascal Alonso, Francisco J. de Abajo Iglesias, Jaime Campos Castelló, Lydia Feito
Grande, Joaquín Herrera Carranza, Javier Júdez Gutiérrez, Ma Concepción Martín Arribas,
Amelia Martín Uranga, Teresa Pàmpols Ros, Ma José Sánchez Martínez & Benedetto
Terracini, Recomendaciones Sobre Los Aspectos Éticos de Las Colecciones de Muestras y Bancos de
Materiales Humanos con Fines de Investigación Biomédica, 81 REV. ESP. SALUD PÚBLICA 95 (Feb.
27, 2007) (Spain) (advising that researchers should let participants choose, during the consent
process, whether to be informed of individual results) noted in Ma’n H. Zawati, Brian Van
Ness & Barbara Maria Knoppers, Incidental Findings in Genomic Research: A Review of
International Norms, 9 GENEDIT 1, 4 (2011). Australian law even requires researchers to inform

236

237

Non-Consensual Disclosures

researchers have ethical duties to return results; these
commentators suggest that, if researchers prefer not to return
results they should simply inform participants through the consent
materials that results will not be returned.43 Regardless of where
commentators stand on researchers’ duties to return individual
results to participants, they widely agree that researchers ought to
inform participants about the return of results upfront, at the
informed consent stage of the research.
What if, for whatever reason, researchers did not obtain
participant consent to the return of results in advance? If that is the
case, might researchers nevertheless be permitted or even required
to return results? To the limited extent that commentators have
addressed this issue, they have generally suggested that
researchers have no moral duty to return results if advanced
consent to that return is lacking and that researchers might even be
morally prohibited from returning results in this context.44 I turn to
these issues in the following two subsections.
1. Consent to research
It is the consensus view, then, that researchers have ethical
duties to return results in the event that they obtained consent to
the study and to the return of results upfront, during the consent
process. But non-consensual research on human biospecimens and
health data is prevalent. As Clayton reports, “a great deal of
research is conducted without seeking individual consent, either
because the IRB waives that requirement or because identifiers are
removed so that the samples are no longer deemed to involve
‘human subjects’”; “most people do not know how their DNA is

participants that results with important implications for the health of participants’ relatives
may be disclosed to those relatives. See Branum & Wolf, supra note 36, at 580.
43. Clayton & McGuire, supra note 38, at 475 (stating that researchers “may state
explicitly” in the consent materials “that individual research results will not be returned due
in part to the difficulties return presents”).
44. For a notable exception, see generally Vardit Ravitsky & Benjamin S. Wilfond,
Disclosing Individual Genetic Results to Research Participants, 6 AM. J. BIOETHICS 8 (2006)
(suggesting that researchers should inform participants in advance that some results will be
returned, but that even if they failed to do so, they should still return results with high clinical
utility—even if the IRB waived the consent requirement on the condition that researchers
would not share results with participants).
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being used in research, what conditions are being investigated, or
even that research is going on at all.”45
In the United States, research might proceed without
participants’ informed consent for a number of reasons. First, there
are multiple legal paths available: researchers can obtain a waiver of
the informed consent requirement from their IRB, or they can meet
conditions for an exemption under the Common Rule.46 And second,
researchers might carry out studies with human subjects without
obtaining informed consent even in cases where such consent is
legally required, whether or not the violation is intentional.
The literature on researchers’ duties to return individual results
often simply presupposes that the research is consensual and says
little or nothing about duties to return results in non-consensual
research. To the extent that recommendations do touch on such
research, they tend to suggest, if only by implication, that
researchers’ duties to return individual results are weaker or
non‑existent, or even that researchers have a duty not to return
results, in this context. The National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute
Working Group (NHLBI Group), a multidisciplinary collaboration
of twenty-eight experts, recommends that, in the event that
researchers do not obtain informed consent to the study, no return
of individual results is ethically required.47 But the authors do not
explain why researchers engaging in research without informed
consent are absolved of a responsibility to return results. Other
commentators, grounding duties to return results in the consent
process or the participant’s voluntary participation, imply that
researchers have an ethical reason to return results only in the case
of consensual research. Franklin Miller, Michelle Mello, and Steven
45. Ellen Wright Clayton, Incidental Findings in Genetics Research Using Archived
DNA, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 286, 287, 290 (2008); see also Terry, supra note 14, at 697 (noting
“concerns that many biobanks obtain and archive samples without the participants’
knowledge . . .”); Karen J. Maschke, Returning Genetic Research Results: Considerations for
Existing No-Return and Future Biobanks, 13 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 559, 563 (2012)
(“Anecdotal reports suggest that many medical research institutions control biobanks
containing biospecimens that were obtained without consent for research or whose
consent status is uncertain.”). Biospecimens and health data collected in the course of
medical treatment might be used for research down the road, without participant consent.
See ONORA O’NEILL, AUTONOMY AND TRUST IN BIOETHICS 42 (2003) (asking “[w]hat consent
requirements, if any, are needed for secondary analyses of medical data collected without
explicit consent in the course of previous treatment?”).
46. See infra Section II.B.1.
47. Fabsitz et al., supra note 15, at 576.
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Joffe argue that it is the researchers’ “privileged access to private
information in the context of a consensual, professional relationship”
that “trigger[s] and give[s] shape to obligations to respond to
incidental findings”: the “consented access to private health-related
information in the context of a professional relationship” “gives rise
to a [researcher’s] duty to respond to incidental findings.”48 In Henry
Richardson and Mildred Cho’s similar formulation, individuals give
up rights to privacy and bodily integrity when they voluntarily agree
to participate in a research study; as a result, “researchers obtain
special responsibilities” toward participants, which include
“communicating a finding that may have a health impact.”49 The
obligation of researchers to warn their participants of health risks
uncovered in the course of research “attach[es] to the special
permissions [that participants give researchers] to handle samples
and associated data . . . .”50 The Department of Health and Human
Services Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Human Research
Protections likewise maintains that, since “[s]ubjects make an
autonomous decision to participate in research, and in so doing help
to create scientific knowledge that is valuable to society and to other
individuals[,]” researchers can “provide recognition and
appreciation for this contribution” by offering subjects “their
individual information that results from the research.”51
48. Franklin G. Miller, Michelle M. Mello & Steven Joffe, Incidental Findings in Human
Subjects Research: What Do Investigators Owe Research Participants?, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 271,
275, 276–77 (2008) (emphasis added); see also Managing Incidental Findings, supra note 22, at
236 (mentioning that, if participants did not consent to the research, then given the “potential
for surprise, it may be appropriate to limit attempts to contact [individuals] to [incidental
findings] offering strong net benefit”).
49. Henry S. Richardson & Mildred K. Cho., Secondary Researchers’ Duties to Return
Incidental Findings and Individual Research Results: A Partial-Entrustment Account, 14 GENETIC
MED. 467, 468–69, 470 (2012) (quoting Illes et al., supra note 32, at 783); see also Miller et al.,
supra note 48, at 275–76 (advancing a similar reciprocity argument); Bartha Maria Knoppers
& Ruth Chadwick, Human Genetic Research: Emerging Trends in Ethics, 6 NATURE REV.
GENETICS 75, 75–76 (2005) (same). For a more detailed discussion of reciprocity- and
gratitude-based arguments for the return of results, see generally Nina Varsava, Human
Subjects Research Without Consent: Duties to Return Individual Findings When Participation was
Non-Consensual, 20 AM. J. BIOETHICS 28 (2020).
50. Richardson & Cho, supra note 49, at 472; see also Illes et al., supra note 32, at 783
(asserting that the return of individual findings that may have a health impact serves to
“demonstrat[e] reciprocity when subjects agree to participate in studies . . . .”) (emphasis added).
51. Sec’y’s Advisory Comm. on Hum. Rsch. Prots., Attachment B: Return of Individual
Research Results, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (July 21, 2016),
https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/sachrp-committee/recommendations/attachment-b-returnindividual-research-results/index.html.
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Some argue that the deeper or more extensive the relationship
between the researcher and participant, the greater the researcher’s
duties with respect to the participant, including duties to return
results. Describing this idea, Valerie Koch writes that “[t]he nature
and duration of the relationship between the research participant
and the investigator may be the most important consideration in
determining whether investigators owe research participants a duty
to disclose research findings.”52 A 2018 “Consensus Study Report”
issued by the National Academies of Science, Engineering, and
Medicine with many contributors from a variety of disciplines
similarly asserts that, “[g]enerally, . . . a deeper relationship between
the investigator and participant gives rise to a greater responsibility
to share results that may be of value to the participant.”53
Researchers will likely have more direct engagement with
participants and so deeper relationships with them in the context
of research with informed consent than without informed consent.
Indeed, if researchers obtain and conduct studies on biospecimens
or health data without informed consent, the researchers might
have no direct engagement at all with participants.54 Participants
might not even be aware of the research relationship. A key
implication of theories that ground duties of care in the depth of the
researcher-participant relationship is that, if participants do not
consent to the research at all, researchers will have minimal duties
(perhaps none at all) with respect to them.
More generally, prevailing theories ground researchers’ duties
to return results in broader duties to respect participant autonomy
52. Koch, supra note 20, at 200.
53. NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G & MED., RETURNING INDIVIDUAL RESEARCH RESULTS
TO PARTICIPANTS 63 (Jeffrey R. Botkin, Michelle Mancher, Emily R. Busta & Autumn S.
Downey eds., 2018); see also Morain et al., supra note 21, at 11 (suggesting that researchers
who have little direct engagement with participants may have lesser obligations to disclose
findings). Other commentators argue similarly that the larger the “range of permissions” or
the greater discretion that participants grant to researchers with respect to the participants’
data and biospecimens, the greater the scope of duties of care that the researchers owe to
participants. Henry S. Richardson & Leah Belsky, The Ancillary-Care Responsibilities of Medical
Researchers: An Ethical Framework for Thinking about the Clinical Care That Researchers Owe Their
Subjects, 34 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 25, 30 (2004); see also Laura M. Beskow & Wylie Burke,
Offering Individual Genetic Research Results: Context Matters, SCI. TRANSLATIONAL MED., 30
June 2010, at 1, 1 (suggesting that duties to return individual results vary in proportion to the
“scope of entrustment involved in the research”).
54. This is the case for non-consensual research as well as research relying on “broad
consent.” I discuss the regulatory provision concerning broad consent below. See infra
Section II.B.1.c.
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and interests, and the latter duties in turn supposedly arise from
the participant’s voluntary contribution to the research. These
theories thus give rise to recommendations to return results in the
context of consensual research but suggest that researchers have
lesser or no duties to return results if research was
non‑consensual.55 But why would researchers have obligations to
respect the autonomy and interests of participants only if their
participation was willing and voluntary?56 Part III, below,
addresses this oversight in the literature; I argue that researchers
have strong ethical reasons to return results even, and indeed
especially, in the context of research without informed consent, and
that the bioethics community ought to train its attention on this gap
in the existing guidance.
2. Consent to the return of results
Even when researchers obtain participant consent to the
research, they might not obtain consent to the return of results. This
seems to have been the case with the Seattle Flu Study, where the
researchers apparently did not inform participants that their samples
might be tested for conditions other than influenza and that other
results might be returned to them or reported to others.57 The
literature has been effectively silent on whether researchers should
disclose results to participants in this kind of scenario. Prevailing
recommendations state that researchers should return results to a
participant if the participant has consented to receive them. But the
recommendations generally do not specify whether researchers
should return results only if a participant has consented to it.

55. Legal disputes about researchers’ duties to inform participants about health risks
have also turned on the issue of voluntary participation or consent. See infra Section II.B.1.a.
Nevertheless, as I argue in section III.B, researchers might have some common law duties to
return results even in non-consensual research under a theory of the duty to warn or rescue.
56. Reacting to efforts to ground duties to return results in reciprocity, Kelly
Fryer‑Edwards and Stephanie Fullerton raise the related question of why participants who
“find themselves in a less intense research relationship” are less entitled to receive results,
when these participants “have the same health-based interest in a given disclosure” and “the
same preferences with respect to knowing a result.” Kelly Fryer-Edwards & Stephanie M.
Fullerton, Relationships with Test-Tubes: Where’s the Reciprocity? 6 AM. J. BIOETHICS 36, 37
(2006). They argue that we need to attend to the “justice implications of relying on the
duration and intensity of the relationship to make disclosure determinations.” Id. Attending
to those implications is part of this Article’s aim.
57. See supra notes 1–8 and accompanying text.
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For example, the NHLBI Group’s guidelines provide that if
researchers uncover individual, health-relevant results, then they
should offer to return these results to participants if “[d]uring the
informed consent process or subsequently, the study participant
has opted to receive [their] individual genetic results.”58 Another
large working group, assembled to “identify consensus
recommendations” concerning the return of results to research
participants, likewise concludes that, “when investigators have a
valid research result that will allow preventive or other steps
important to protect the participant’s health, these data should be
offered to identifiable research participants.” The authors note that
this idea has been widely endorsed.59 But they assert that the
conclusion is based on the “assum[ption] that the participant has
consented to the return of results in the informed-consent
process.”60 The group says nothing about the responsibility of
researchers regarding the disclosure of results in the event that
participants have not consented to disclosure upfront.
Some commentators assert that researchers are not permitted
to disclose results if participants have not given informed consent
to the disclosure. For example, a Canadian policy statement
provides that, “[t]o respect the participants’ autonomy, the
communication of the findings determined to be material can only
be done when participants or their authorized third parties have
consented to receiving them initially or as part of the ongoing
consent process.”61 This prescription suggests that researchers
may return results only if participants consented both to the
research and to the disclosure of results.
One might contend that to avert this kind of dilemma,
researchers could contact a participant who did not consent upfront
to receiving individual findings and ask if they now wish to receive
58. Fabsitz et al., supra note 15, at 575.
59. Gail P. Jarvik, Laura M. Amendola, Jonathan S. Berg, Kyle Brothers, Ellen W.
Clayton, Wendy Chun, Barbara J. Evans, James P. Evans, Stephanie M. Fullerton, Carlos J.
Gallego, Nanibaa’ A. Garrison, Stacy W. Gray, Ingrid A. Holm, Iftikhar J. Kullo, Lisa
Soleymani Lehmann, Cathy McCarty, Cynthia A. Prows, Heidi L. Rehm, Richard R. Sharp,
Joseph Salama, Saskia Sanderson, Sara L. Van Driest, Marc S. Williams, Susan M. Wolf,
Wendy A. Wolf, eMERGE Act-ROR Comm. & CERC Comm., CSER Act-ROR Working Grp.
& Wylie Burke, Return of Genomic Results to Research Participants: The Floor, the Ceiling, and the
Choices in Between, 94 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 818, 818, 821 (2014).
60. Id.
61. CAN. INSTS. OF HEALTH RSCH. et al., supra note 42, at 34 (emphasis added).
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such findings. The appeal of this strategy, however, is largely
superficial, because presenting the option to a participant in this
way effectively amounts to informing them that an important
health finding has been uncovered. And so, although a researcher
in this context probably should ask the participant whether they
wish to receive a result that has been discovered before disclosing
the details, we should not presume that this gesture would solve
the lack of advanced consent problem. As Stephanie Morain and
coauthors explain, “[t]his issue has been deemed the problem of the
‘cold call,’” in which an unwitting participant gets a call out of the
blue from a researcher informing the participant that the researcher
possesses important information about the participant’s health and
asks the participant whether they would like to hear it.62 At that
point, the cat is already partly out of the bag.
Some groups recognize the critical gap in their prescriptions but
offer only unsatisfying stopgap measures in response. For example,
the NHLBI Group asserts that, if participants did not consent to the
return of results in advance, then “researchers should consult with
their IRB regarding the appropriateness of communicating
individual [results] . . . .”63 This suggestion merely passes the
problem onto the IRB to resolve. In a report on the ethical
management of individual findings in genomic research, an
NIH‑funded multidisciplinary working group acknowledges cases
in which participants have not consented to the return of results,
observing that in these cases “researchers or the biobank may
nonetheless encounter findings of high health significance and
actionability.”64 The authors note that “how to handle return in this

62. Morain et al., supra note 21, at 11; see also Clayton, supra note 45, at 290 (observing
that “[i]n most cases of genomics research using archived samples, the problem of the ‘cold
call’ and the question that often follows—How can I say I do not want to know when
someone says they have important information about me?—is unavoidable.”); Gail P. Jarvik
et al., supra note 59, at 822 (suggesting that participants should be asked their preferences at
the informed consent stage, since “[f]raming the conversation as ‘if we find . . . would you
want’ avoids the potentially coercive ‘we have . . . do you want.’”).
63. Fabsitz et al., supra note 15, at 576.
64. Susan M. Wolf, Brittney N. Crock, Brian Van Ness, Frances Lawrenz, Jeffrey P.
Kahn, Laura M. Beskow, Mildred K. Cho, Michael F. Christman, Robert C. Green, Ralph Hall,
Judy Illes, Moira Keane, Bartha M. Knoppers, Barbara A. Koenig, Isaac S. Kohane, Bonnie
LeRoy, Karen J. Maschke, William McGeveran, Pilar Ossorio, Lisa S. Parker, Gloria M.
Petersen, Henry S. Richardson, Joan A. Scott, Sharon F. Terry, Benjamin S. Wilfond & Wendy
A. Wolf, Managing Incidental Findings and Research Results in Genomic Research Involving
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scenario is [a] hard question.”65 And they indicate that “an
emerging recommendation is to allow some return, where possible,
but only of the most important findings, that is, those [with strong
net benefit].”66 The authors seem to believe that researchers should
be permitted, but not necessarily required, to return results if
participants did not consent in advance to receive them. But the
suggestion is vague, and no argument is provided to support it.
Bioethicists and biomedical researchers have extensively
debated whether researchers should sometimes return
health‑relevant results, and have reached a consensus around the
conclusion that they should. However, the literature simultaneously
asserts a requirement to inform participants ex ante about the return
of results and seems to assume that researchers will do so. Scholars
have thus side-stepped the question of how health-relevant results
should be handled in the event that participants were not given the
opportunity upfront to consent to disclosure.
B. The Legal Landscape
What does the law have to say about disclosing results to
participants who did not consent to the disclosure in advance? This
section takes up that issue, focusing on the Common Rule, but also
touching on related legal provisions.
1. The Common Rule
The set of regulations known as the “Common Rule” governs
the consent process and related aspects of research involving
human participants. It applies to research funded by federal
agencies and was last updated in 2018, with a general compliance
date of January 21, 2019.67 The rule does not impose any affirmative
duties on researchers to return results to participants, and even creates
incentives for researchers not to return results.68 This subsection
Biobanks and Archived Data Sets, 14 GENETICS MED. 361, 380 (2012) [hereinafter Biobanks and
Archived Data Sets].
65. Id. at 372.
66. Id. at 380.
67. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(l)(2) (2020). See supra note 9 for more details on the research
covered by the Common Rule.
68. Id. § 46(a). Two articles focusing on biobank research discuss how federal
regulations disincentivize the return of results by encouraging the de-identification of
biospecimens and data, despite the strong ethical reasons supporting return in some cases.
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analyzes the relationship between the return of individual results
and consent requirements under the current Common Rule.
a. Informed consent. In the event that researchers opt for
traditional informed consent, consent materials must include “[a]
statement regarding whether clinically relevant research results,
including individual research results, will be disclosed to subjects,
and if so, under what conditions . . . .”69 If researchers prefer not
to, or are unable to, devise a plan for the return of results in
advance of the study, then they might opt for a blanket statement
indicating that results will not be returned. Such a statement
might in turn create legal duties not to return results, even if the
researchers later determine that they have moral reasons to return
them. This is because returning results would violate the consent
terms, possibly posing problems not only under the Common
Rule but also under contract or tort law.
The Common Rule does require that the consent materials
include “[a] statement that significant new findings developed
during the course of the research that may relate to the subject’s
willingness to continue participation will be provided to the
subject.”70 This provision could be read to require researchers to
return individual results under certain circumstances, although as
far as I am aware neither officials nor biomedical researchers have
interpreted it that way. In the vast majority of studies, it is difficult
to see how receiving even highly concerning and actionable results
would affect the participant’s willingness to participate. An
exception, perhaps, would be studies involving substantial and
ongoing participant engagement.
In the Maryland state case of Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger
Institute71 (discussed at greater length below in this section), the
court did suggest that “information that might bear on
McGeveran et al., supra note 35, at 504–29; Leili Fatehi & Ralph F. Hall, Enforcing the Rights of
Human Sources to Informed Consent and Disclosures of Incidental Findings from Biobanks and
Researchers: State Mechanisms in Light of Broad Regulatory Failure, 13 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.
575, 593–98 (2012). My analysis here of the regulatory scheme is consistent with and expands
on the views presented in those articles.
69. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(c)(8).
70. Id. § 46.116(c)(5).
71. Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807 (Md. 2001).
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[participants’] willingness to continue to participate in the
study . . . includes . . . continuing warnings as to all the potential
risks and hazards . . . that arise during the research.”72 This study
represents a special case, however, because the health risk that
researchers uncovered (lead exposure) was tied to the research in
such a way that participants could minimize or mitigate the risk by
exiting the study. This is critically different from studies where
researchers uncover health-relevant findings such as genetic
abnormalities, which exist completely independently of the
research and are neither created nor exacerbated by it.
The Common Rule does not create a private right of action, so
a research participant cannot sue researchers under the rule for
violations.73 Researchers do face penalties for violations, however,
including federal orders to stop the research and rescinding of
federal funding.74 Moreover, some scholars have suggested that a
consent form creates a binding agreement between researcher and
participant, and the researcher thus has a contractual duty to act in
accordance with its terms.75 For Elizabeth Pike and coauthors, “[a]
clear and appropriate [legal] rule would require that researchers
disclose in the informed consent document the extent to which
[findings] will be returned to participants, with a corresponding
legal duty to act in a manner consistent with the terms set forth in
the informed consent document.”76 An implication of this proposal
is that, if the consent document provides that results will not be

72. Id. at 843.
73. Koch, supra note 20, at 176, 186–90 (explaining the lack of a private right of action
under the Common Rule and FDA regulations and asserting that, because a duty of care is
not recognized in the regulations, “courts are generally reluctant to recognize a
duty‑conferring relationship between the investigator and research participant”).
74. OFFICE FOR HUMAN RESEARCH PROTECTIONS (OHRP) DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES, OHRP’S COMPLIANCE OVERSIGHT PROCEDURES FOR EVALUATING
INSTITUTIONS (Oct. 14, 2009), https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/sites/default/files/ohrp/
compliance/evaluation/ohrpcomp.pdf; see also 45 C.F.R., § 46.123(a) (2020) (“The
department or agency head may require that Federal department or agency support for any
project be terminated or suspended in the manner prescribed in applicable program
requirements, when the department or agency head finds an institution has materially failed
to comply with the terms of this policy.”); 21 C.F.R. § 56.121 (2019).
75. Elizabeth R. Pike, Karen H. Rothenberg & Benjamin E. Berkman, Finding Fault?
Exploring Legal Duties to Return Incidental Findings in Genomic Research, 102 GEO. L.J. 795,
795 (2014).
76. Id. at 831.
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returned, then not only will researchers have no legal duty to return
them, but they will actually have a legal duty not to do so.
The Pike group does note that, if informed consent materials are
silent on or inadequately address the return of results, “the general
assumption should not be that researchers are therefore protected
from legal liability”; instead, “courts should look carefully and
skeptically at inadequate consent documents.”77 The authors list
some factors for courts to consider when evaluating a consent form
and whether a researcher has a duty to return results. The primary
factor is “whether and to what extent a research participant
reasonably relied on a researcher to return [findings].”78 If informed
consent materials did not indicate that results would be returned,
then a participant would have a hard time arguing that they
reasonably relied on the return of individual results, especially
since it is not the norm for researchers to return results.79 Indeed,
the authors explain that “[t]his factor could be satisfied by showing
that the researcher (by word or action) explicitly took on a duty of
disclosure on which it was reasonable for the participant to rely.”80
Accordingly, under the Pike framework, researchers would be
unlikely to have a legal duty to return results unless they informed
participants in advance that results would be returned.
In the case of Grimes, the Maryland Court of Appeals
(Maryland’s highest state court), determined that the plaintiffs’
consent to participate in a research study created duties of care on
the part of the researchers, including a duty to return certain healthrelevant results to participants.81 The Grimes defendant had
conducted a study of lead abatement methods, which involved
testing lead levels in the participant homes and in the children who
lived there.82 The defendant had failed to notify participants, in a
timely fashion, of dangerous levels of lead exposure, and the
plaintiffs (several participants in the study) sued for negligence.83
The Maryland court reasoned that the informed consent agreements
“created contractual relationships imposing duties [of care],” which
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 839.
Id. at 840.
See infra Section II.C.
Pike et al., supra note 77, at 840.
Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 807 (Md. 2001).
Id. at 811–12.
Id. at 818.
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in turn could form the basis of a negligence action against the
researchers.84 According to the court, the consent form served as
evidence that the participants agreed to participate “with the
expectation that they would . . . receive promptly any information
that might bear on their willingness to continue to participate in the
study,” including “continuing warnings as to all the potential risks
and hazards . . . that arise during the research.”85 Indeed, the consent
document specified that the researchers would share “specific
blood-lead results,” and a plaintiff contended “that this agreement
between the parties gave rise to a duty owed by [the researcher] to
provide her with that information in a timely manner.”86
Despite its emphasis on the contractual nature of the
relationship, the court suggested that a “special relationship”
between researcher and subject “giving rise to duties” might exist
even in the absence of a contract and that the special relationship
can arise out of state or federal “governmental regulations,”
including the Common Rule.87 Nevertheless, because the court
heavily emphasized the consent materials and consensual
interactions between the researcher and the participants, the
reasoning of the opinion would not readily support a duty to return
results in the absence of the consent agreement and participants’
reasonable expectations that they would receive results.88 And so,
while the Grimes case illustrates the possibility of a private right of
action based on the failure of a researcher to disclose individual
results to participants, it does not offer much fuel for a duty to
disclose if participants did not consent to the return of results in
advance, never mind if participants did not give informed consent
to the research study itself.

84. Id. at 843.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 844.
87. Id. at 819. But see Koch, supra note 20, at 189 (observing that courts have “generally
refused to find that the federal rules and regulations governing informed consent in research
give rise to a private right of action for research participants”).
88. But see Fatehi & Hall, supra note 68, at 627 (quoting Grimes) (suggesting that the
case “shows that state courts may derive and define the duties owed by the researcher to the
human subject not just from the relationship created by, and terms of, the informed consent
agreement, but from the privileged ability of researchers to ‘anticipate, discover, and
understand’ their subjects’ potential health risks”).
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b. Waiver of Informed Consent. The Common Rule allows
researchers to obtain a waiver or alteration of consent requirements by
their IRB if a number of conditions are met. These conditions include
that “[t]he research involves no more than minimal risk to the
subjects,” “[t]he research could not practicably be carried out without
the requested waiver or alteration,” “[t]he waiver or alteration will not
adversely affect the rights and welfare of the subjects,” and
“[w]henever appropriate, the subjects . . . will be provided with
additional pertinent information after participation.”89
Individual health-relevant results could conceivably qualify as
“additional pertinent information,” such that researchers who
obtained a waiver may in some cases face an obligation to return
individual results to participants after the study. There is no
evidence, however, that researchers, IRBs, or agencies are
interpreting the “additional pertinent information” provision in
this way. On the contrary, IRBs sometimes grant waivers of consent
only on the condition that researchers will not re-contact
participants to disclose results.90 And some scholars likewise
maintain that researchers should not be permitted to waive consent
if they anticipate recontacting participants to return results, since
participants would have to be informed about the researchers’
intentions in advance.91
Researchers who obtain a waiver of the consent requirements,
then, seem to have no regulatory duties to return results, and
IRB conduct, as well as scholarly commentary, suggest that
researchers may obtain a waiver only if they are not going to
return results. The possibility of obtaining a waiver of consent

89. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(f)(3) (2020).
90. See Ravitsky & Wilfond, supra note 44, at 12 (describing a study of “gene
expression in breast biopsy specimens” in which “the IRBs waived the requirement to obtain
participants’ consent to use their specimens, provided that investigators would not contact
them with any results”); see also NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G & MED., supra note 5344, at 60
(reporting that, “[h]istorically, institutional review boards (IRBs) have actively discouraged
the disclosure of research results to individual participants apart from a few exceptional
circumstances”). Some scholars indicate that their home IRBs do not allow researchers to
contact former participants if those participants did not consent to participate in the research.
See Clayton, supra note 45, at 286.
91. See Ellen Wright Clayton, Informed Consent and Biobanks, 33 J.L. Med. & Ethics 15,
20 (2005).
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requirements might accordingly make researchers who would
otherwise be inclined to return results less likely to do so.
c. Exemptions for secondary research. The Common Rule gives
researchers the opportunity to sidestep the detailed informed
consent requirements and instead obtain “broad consent for the
storage, maintenance, and secondary research use of identifiable
private information or identifiable biospecimens.”92 The broad
consent requirements are significantly less onerous than the
informed consent ones.93
The Common Rule section on Exempt Research indicates that
researchers may enjoy exemption from other policy requirements
by relying on broad consent only if (among other things) they do
“not include returning individual research results to subjects as part
of the study plan.”94 In turn, the broad consent process requires
participants to be informed that “clinically relevant research
results” “may not be disclosed to [them]” “[u]nless it is known” that
such results “will be disclosed to [them] in all circumstances.”95
Given that researchers can rely on broad consent to exempt them
from other regulatory requirements only if they do not have a plan
to return results, it seems unlikely that at the point of obtaining
broad consent researchers would know that results will be returned
to participants in all circumstances. The exemption conditions
make any such knowledge highly unlikely because they require
researchers who wish to rely on broad consent and avoid other
more demanding regulatory requirements to refrain from planning
for the return of results—possibly even to cancel any intention they
would otherwise have to return results.96

92. 45 C.F.R.§ 46.116(d).
93. Compare 45 C.F.R.§ 46.116(d) (requirements for broad consent) with 45
C.F.R.§ 46.116(a)–(c) (requirements for informed consent).
94. 45 C.F.R. § 46.104(d)(8)(iv) (emphasis added).
95. Id. § 46.116(d)(6) (emphasis added).
96. See Office for Human Research Protections, Attachment C—Recommendations for
Broad Consent Guidance, HHS.GOV (July 26, 2017), https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/sachrpcommittee/recommendations/attachment-c-august-2-2017/index.html (stating that to
qualify for a broad-consent-based exemption, “the intention to return individual research
results [cannot] be part of the study plan—that is, . . . the return of results [cannot be] a
planned, premeditated activity contemplated in the protocol”).
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Accordingly, researchers obtaining broad consent have a
significant incentive not to obtain participant consent to the return of
results and instead to inform participants that results may not be
returned—effectively, to get participant consent for non-return. This
approach helps protect them, and other researchers, from potential
legal duties to return results uncovered in the course of secondary
research, and enables them and others to proceed without any plan
to return results and therefore to qualify for the broad-consent-based
exemption from other regulatory requirements.
Congruent with the regulations, some bioethicists advise that if
researchers do plan to return any individual results, then “detailed
informed consent will be ethically and legally required.”97 This
kind of prescription gives researchers reason not to plan for or
anticipate the return of results. Researchers who do not make a plan
in advance to return results are less likely, ultimately, to return
results than those who do make such a plan—since planning to do
something generally makes it more likely that you will do the thing.
That is the point of plans, after all! The Common Rule’s broad
consent provision, then, together with its broad-consent-based
category of exempt research, encourage researchers not to obtain
participant consent to the return of results, not to plan to return
results to participants, and ultimately not to return results to them.
In response to comments received through the notice and
comment process, the Office for Human Research Protections
(OHRP) itself stated that they recognize the concern that “this
exemption does not provide an incentive to investigators to
provide individual results to subjects.”98 But OHRP insisted that
97. Clayton supra note 91, at 20; see also Ravitsky & Wilfond, supra note 44, at 15.
98. Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 82 Fed. Reg. 7,199 (Jan. 19,
2017) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 46). Many comments, to both the 2011 Advanced Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking and the 2015 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, expressed worries that
if researchers who do not plan to return results may be exempt from full IRB review, that
would create self-interested incentives for researchers not to return results. See, e.g., Stacey
Berg, Comment Letter on the Common Rule (Oct. 3, 2011) (“We would like to note that
excusing use of existing biospecimens from IRB review unless the investigator plans to
return results to subjects could create a disincentive for investigators to return results.”);
Univ. of Wash. Ctr. for Genomics & Healthcare Equal., Comment Letter on the Common
Rule (Oct. 24, 2011) (“under such a policy, sensible investigators would elect not to develop
plans to return results”; “this approach [accordingly] creates an inappropriate disincentive
to returning results that is particularly problematic for research with translational
potential”); Ann Bonham, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule for Federal Policy for the
Protection of Human Subjects (Jan. 4, 2016) (expressing concern that the rule “that deems
research with stored biospecimens ineligible to be considered exempt if the investigator
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“the challenges of how and when to return such results warrant
consultation with the IRB” and that when researchers plan to return
results, “it would almost always be appropriate for the study to be
reviewed by an IRB . . . .”99 It is not just that the terms of the
exemption do not create an incentive for researchers to return results
though. The terms actually disincentivize the return results, since
they substantially reduce the regulatory burden for researchers who
agree to refrain from anticipating the return of results.
Another category of exempt research under the Common Rule
comprises “[s]econdary research uses of identifiable private
information or identifiable biospecimens” in which (1) information
“is recorded by the investigator in such a manner that the identity
of the human subjects cannot readily be ascertained directly or
through identifiers linked to the subjects, [(2)] the investigator does
not contact the subjects, and [(3)] the investigator will not
re‑identify subjects.”100 An implicit condition of this exemption
would seem to be that individual research results will not be
returned to subjects, since that would require not only identifying
but also contacting them.101
As other scholars observe, the regulations “strongly encourage
secondary researchers who work with de-identified data to promise,
in advance, that they will make no attempt to reidentify.”102
anticipates returning research results to individual subjects . . . demonstrates neither respect
for persons nor the facilitation of research”); Jennifer Wagner, Comment Letter on Proposed
Rule for Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects (Dec. 9, 2015) (expressing
disappointment “with the language that would make it more difficult for researchers to
engage in equitable research practices—specifically, language that can only be interpreted as
an attempt to discourage researchers from returning research results to participants”).
99. Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 82 Fed. Reg. at 7,199.
100. 45 C.F.R. § 46.104(d)(4)(ii).
101. As McGeveran et al., supra note 35, at 513–14, 519, observe, the regulations “in many
ways . . . discourage the return of findings”; “[i]n particular, the strong and increasing emphasis
on robust deidentification standards generally deters return of results,” and “[i]nstead of
providing any mechanisms to facilitate the return of results where it is otherwise justified, the
[regulations] treat[] reidentification as categorically undesirable.” The authors argue that the
rules “should specifically stipulate that return of individual research findings can be an
ethically appropriate reason to reidentify specimens or data.” Id. at 530. See also Fatehi & Hall,
supra note 68, at 593 (explaining that, “even when disclosures of IFs remain a [factual]
possibility, the very act of considering them for disclosure or identifying their sources may
trigger an uncertain and complex web of regulatory requirements”).
102. McGeveran et al., supra note 35, at 524. Focusing on the obligations of secondary
researchers in the biobank research context, the authors explain how an exemption for deidentified materials encourages such researchers to “foreswear any . . . plans to re-contact
contributors in order to avoid . . . administrative costs and delay to research,” and they
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Researchers might even sever their own access to the information
necessary to identify participants in an effort to qualify for the
exemption, thereby making it impossible for them to contact
participants in the event that individual health-relevant results
are discovered.103
2. Other rules
Other legal provisions create further incentives for researchers
not to disclose health-relevant results to participants. Research
laboratories are exempt from the Clinical Laboratory Improvement
Amendments (CLIA) requirements, but only if they do not “report
patient specific results for the diagnosis, prevention or treatment of
any disease or impairment of, or the assessment of the health of
individual patients.”104 If researchers wish to return individual
results that meet the former description, then they would need to
either have their lab CLIA certified and ensure that it meets CLIA
requirements—which include maintaining detailed records on all
“patients”; maintaining personnel with specific types of expertise,
such as a technical consultant and clinical consultant; and carrying
out annual evaluations of all activities—or else reproduce the

observe that both the Common Rule and HIPAA “encourage early and robust
deidentification of specimens and data” and “[n]either promotes planning to reidentify those
same specimens or data.” Id. at 524, 529; see also Fatehi & Hall, supra note 68, at 628–29 (“The
recognition of duties arising from the ability of researchers to foresee or identify information
of health significance to research participants is a factor that is especially significant in the
context of secondary research on archived specimens and DNA information because the very
purpose of such secondary research is often to establish the link between particular
conditions and the traits thought to be associated with those conditions.”).
103. See McGeveran et al., supra note 35, at 518, 528 (noting that some biobanks
“eradicate the return path intentionally,” “irretrievably deidentify[ing] specimens and data,
[and thus] making reidentification impossible”); Fatehi & Hall, supra note 68, at 581 (“Some
biobanks deliberately and permanently de-identify specimens and data prior to sharing
them with downstream secondary researchers so that no obligations to human sources may
exist”; as a result, “secondary researchers may not have any contact with the human sources
and may not know or be able to determine the sources’ identities.”). Note that the Common
Rule governs only research involving human subjects as defined in the policy and that
definition excludes research using human data or specimens that are not identifiable;
accordingly, if the connection between the individual and the data or specimen is actually
irreversibly severed then research using the material would not be regulated under the
policy. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101(a), 46.102(e)(1).
104. 42 C.F.R. § 493.3(b)(2).
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results in a CLIA-certified lab.105 Otherwise, the researchers could
be subject to severe sanctions, including fines and imprisonment.106
As we can see then, although the law and policy governing
human subjects research allows researchers to commit themselves
to returning individual results, it does not require them to make
any such commitment, and in multiple ways imposes obstacles to
the return of results. By offering incentives to researchers who do
not plan to disclose results to participants, the regulations make it
less likely that researchers will seek participant consent to
disclosure, and in turn less likely that researchers will be legally
required or even permitted to disclose results that they uncover in
the course of research.107
C. The Practice
Although researchers do sometimes offer participants
individual results, in general “[human subjects] researchers have
recognized no responsibility to communicate clinically important
information [to participants].”108 A 2012 nation-wide survey study
105. Id. §§ 491.10, 493.1409, 493.1415, 493.1453, 491.11.
106. Id. § 493.1800. There is a debate in the literature about whether research labs that
return individual health-relevant findings are subject to CLIA. See Jarvik et al., supra note 59
at 819, 822–24 (discussing the CLIA debate and concluding that “[f]urther work is needed on
the role of CLIA compliance in the return of research results.”). Some commentators interpret
CLIA as applying to such research labs. See, e.g., NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G. & MED., supra
note 53, at 28 (recognizing a “current absolute prohibition on the return of research results
from non-CLIA-certified laboratories”). Others disagree. See, e.g., Barbara J. Evans & Susan
M. Wolf, A Faustian Bargain That Undermines Research Participants’ Privacy Rights and Return
of Results, 71 FLA. L. REV. 1281, 1318 (2019) (arguing that research labs are exempt from CLIA
requirements because when researchers return individual findings it is not for a direct
clinical purpose). It is beyond the scope of this Article to wade into this CLIA debate, but in
my opinion the more reasonable interpretation is that CLIA will typically apply to research
labs that return individual results, since the purpose of returning these results is generally,
even if indirectly, “for the diagnosis, prevention or treatment of . . . disease or impairment
of, or the assessment of the health of individual patients.” 42 C.F.R. § 493.3(b)(2).
107. The Health Insurance and Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) gives
individuals the right to access, at their own initiative, personal information about them
contained in health records that HIPAA-covered entities (health care providers and
associated entities) maintain about them; accordingly, if a research finding is documented in
an individual’s health record, then the individual would have access to it under HIPAA. 45
C.F.R. § 164.524.
108. Wolf, supra note 38, at 443; see also NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G. & MED., supra
note 53, at 67 (“Individual research results are commonly not returned to participants despite
a growing body of literature demonstrating that many participants are interested in receiving
their results.”). It is difficult to determine what proportion of human subjects research
includes information about the return of individual findings in consent materials. A 2004
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of biobanking in the United States found that, of biobanks that have
access to identifying information of participants, less than twenty
percent return individual results.109 Another study found that, of
the biobanks that address return of results at all, “33–46% had
documents saying they do return some information.”110 The
inclusion of a blanket statement in the original consent form to the
effect that individual results will not be disclosed seems to be a
popular strategy.111 It should not be surprising that researchers
often decide not to return individual results, given the state of the
law and policy analyzed in the previous section.
And yet, evidence overwhelmingly suggests that people want to
receive individual results and that they view these results as highly

survey of imaging studies found that four out of six consent forms examined were silent on
the issue of incidental findings. Judy Illes, Matthew P. Kirschen, Kim Karetsky, Megan Kelly,
Arnold Saha, John E. Desmond, Thomas A. Raffin, Gary H. Glover & Scott W. Atlas,
Discovery and Disclosure of Incidental Findings in Neuroimaging Research, 20 J. MAGNETIC
RESONANCE IMAGING 743–47 (2004).
109. Gail E. Henderson, Teresa P. Edwards, R. Jean Cadigan, Arlene M. Davis,
Catherine Zimmer, Ian Conlon & Bryan J. Weiner, Stewardship Practices of U.S. Biobanks,
5 SCI. TRANSLATIONAL MED. 1, 2 (2013); see also R. Jean Cadigan, Teresa P. Edwards,
Dragana Lassiter, Arlene M. Davis & Gail E. Henderson, “Forward-Thinking” in U.S.
Biobanking, 21 GENETIC TESTING & MOLECULAR BIOMARKERS 148, 150 (2017),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5367905/ (finding, through a survey
study of 327 U.S. biobanks, that 57% have policies stating that results will never be returned);
Laura A. Siminoff, Maureen Wilson-Genderson, Maghboeba Mosavel, Laura Barker, Jennifer
Trgina & Heather M. Traino, Confidentiality in Biobanking Research: A Comparison of Donor and
Nondonor Families’ Understanding of Risks, 21 GENETIC TESTING & MOLECULAR BIOMARKERS
171, 175 (2017) (“Currently, few large-scale genomic research projects in the United States
routinely return results to participants.”).
110. Biobanks and Archived Data Sets, supra note 64 at 365 (emphasis added).
111. See Karen J. Maschke, supra note 45, at 561 (“The limited empirical data
regarding biobanks in the U.S. suggest that most biobanks use the no-return approach.”);
Alessi, supra note 23, at 1708 (“[M]any biobanks explicitly prohibit returning any
[individual] results and inform research participants of this prohibition upon the initial
submission of their biological materials.”). For example, a cluster of U.S.-based cancer trial
groups has adopted a common consent template for biobank participation that includes a
provision specifying that, “Research results will not be returned to you or your doctor.”
Gloria M. Petersen & Brian Van Ness, Returning a Research Participant’s Genomic Results to
Relatives: Perspectives from Managers of Two Distinct Research Biobanks, 43 J.L. MED. & ETHICS
523, 526 (2015); see also McGeveran, Fatehi & McGarraugh, supra note 35, at 525 n.201
(citing an FAQ document from a national biobank, which provides that participants “will
not receive any information from [their] donated samples” and “will not receive results
on the research performed using [their] samples”). By some accounts, most biobank
contributors globally “have signed consent forms [indicating] that they will not be
contacted.” Donna M. Gitter, The Ethics of Big Data in Genomics: The Instructive Icelandic
Saga of the Incidentalome, 18 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 351, 358 (2019).
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valuable to them personally. As Miller and David Shalowitz report,
“[p]articipants consistently indicate that they are interested in
receiving research results, in spite of transient distress that
communication of results sometimes elicits.”112 Carmen Breitkopf
and coauthors found, through a survey study investigating
preferences about the return of results (including a sample of actual
biobank participants as well as a control sample of the general
population), that over ninety-six percent of respondents would want
to be informed of individual “medically useful” genetic results.113
Many people wish to receive even results that do not meet my
threshold for health relevance.114 A study of participants in
neuroimaging research found that over ninety percent of
participants “would want to be informed of an incidental finding
regardless of its significance.”115 In the Breitkopf group’s survey
study, over fifty percent of people believed that a result “definitely
[should] be offered” even if it indicates only a “small chance of
developing disease.”116 Over eighty percent agreed that “results
showing an increased risk for a disease that could be prevented or
passed to children and a result providing information a person can
112. D. I. Shalowitz & F. G. Miller, The Search for Clarity in Communicating Research
Results to Study Participants, J.L. MED. & ETHICS, Sept. 2008 at 1, 1; see also Mildred K. Cho,
Understanding Incidental Findings in the Context of Genetics and Genomics, 36 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 280, 281 (2008) (“Empirical research suggests that participants want to know individual
research results”); Miller et al., supra note 48, at 277 (“Empirical research suggests that few
subjects would choose not to receive findings.”); Clayton, supra note 45, at 288 (reporting that
“research participants often want and even feel entitled to receive their results”).
113. Carmen Radecki Breitkopf, Gloria M. Petersen, Susan M. Wolf, Kari G. Chaffee,
Marguerite E. Robinson, Deborah R. Gordon, Noralane M. Lindor & Barbara A. Koenig,
Preferences Regarding Return of Genomic Results to Relatives of Research Participants, Including
After Participant Death: Empirical Results from a Cancer Biobank, 43 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 464, 467
(2015); see also Juli Murphy, Joan Scott, David Kaufman, Gail Geller, Lisa LeRoy & Kathy
Hudson, Public Expectations for Return of Results from Large-Cohort Genetic Research, 8 AM. J.
BIOETHICS 36, 41 (2008) (finding that focus group participants have a “strong interest in
receiving individual genetic research results”); Megan Fong, Kathryn L. Braun & R. Mei-Ling
Chang, Native Hawaiian Preferences for Informed Consent and Disclosure of Results from Genetic
Research, 2006 J. CANCER EDUC. S47 (finding that, “[m]ost respondents wanted results
reported to them (87.6%)”); Kenji Matsui, Reidar K. Lie, Yoshikuni Kita & Hirotsugu Ueshima,
Ethics of Future Disclosure of Individual Risk Information in a Genetic Cohort Study: A Survey of
Donor Preferences, 18 J. EPIDEMIOL. 217, 219 (2008) (finding that an overwhelming majority of
participants “wished to be recontacted if any genetic risk information of clinical significance
should be discovered”).
114. See supra Section I.A.
115. Matthew P. Kirschen, Agnieszka Jaworska & Judy Illes, Subjects’ Expectations in
Neuroimaging Research, 23 J. MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING 205, 207 (2006).
116. Breitkopf et al., supra note 113, at 471.
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act on definitely should be offered,” and over sixty-eight percent
believed “that researchers should offer results to participants,
no matter how much money it costs [the researchers].”117 Studies
suggest that people have strong preferences in favor of receiving
individual results, across various types of biomedical research.
These preferences in themselves do not demonstrate that
researchers should disclose results, but they do weigh in favor of
that conclusion.
In the next section, I argue on ethical grounds that researchers
should, under certain circumstances, return individual,
health‑relevant results to participants. And I suggest further that
the ethical reasons to return results may be even stronger in cases
where participants did not consent to the return in advance. In light
of my ethical analysis, I suggest that the law should at least not
prevent or discourage the disclosure of individual health-relevant
results, even if it should not necessarily impose affirmative duties
on researchers to disclose them.
III. THE REASON TO RETURN RESULTS
In focusing on settings in which researchers addressed the return
of results during the informed consent process, bioethicists have
tended to avoid some of the toughest questions about researchers’
duties to return individual results. I agree with the consensus view
that it would be best to inform participants upfront, at the consent
stage, about the return of results. But by grounding duties and
permissions to return results in the consent process, many scholars
have suggested, whether explicitly or implicitly, that researchers
have lesser or no duties to return results in no-consent-to-return
cases; this kind of argument thus neglects the rights and interests of
the many research participants who are not given the opportunity ex
ante to consent to the return of results.
My target of analysis here is not the ethical or legal status of
different approaches to consent, but rather the status of different
decisions regarding the return of results. I therefore largely refrain
from ethical or legal judgments about the consent process itself.
Instead, recognizing that researchers in fact employ various
approaches to consent, I evaluate decisions concerning the return
of results in light of those different approaches. I find that
117. Id. at 469, 471.
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researchers have strong ethical reasons to return health-relevant
results regardless of consent setting. To support this claim, I present
several analogous contexts in which experts have duties, ethical
and sometimes legal too, to warn individuals of dangers when
those individuals are unlikely to learn about the dangers through
alternative channels, and even if no consent to the warning was
obtained. This kind of responsibility is not domain specific: we
should not make a policy exception for biomedical researchers.
A. The Ethics of Informing
In a variety of contexts, we are subject to warnings from experts
and public officials to which we did not consent. Sometimes, but not
always, we are given the opportunity to opt out of such warnings.
For example, in 2013, the American College of Medical Genetics
and Genomics (ACMG) issued a guidance statement providing that
clinical laboratories performing genetic sequencing should search for
a variety of medically actionable pathogenic variants and affected
individuals should be informed of the results even if they did not
seek testing for those variants.118 Laboratories were to analyze and
report results for a host of specific genes, which “were selected based
on substantial clinical evidence that pathogenic variants result in a
high likelihood of severe disease that is preventable if identified
before symptoms occur.”119 As Amy McGuire and coauthors explain,
118. Robert C. Green, Jonathan S. Berg, Wayne W. Grody, Sarah S. Kalia, Bruce R. Korf,
Christa L. Martin, Amy L. McGuire, Robert L. Nussbaum, Julianne M. O’Daniel, Kelly E.
Ormond, Heidi L. Rehm, Michael S. Watson, Marc S. Williams & Leslie G. Biesecker, ACMG
Recommendations for Reporting of Incidental Findings in Clinical Exome and Genome Sequencing,
15 GENETICS MED. 565, 573 (2013) (recommending “that when a report is issued for clinically
indicated exome and genome sequencing, a minimum list of conditions, genes, and variants
should be routinely evaluated and reported to the ordering clinician” and “that these
findings be reported without seeking preferences from the patient and family”).
119. ACMG Board of Directors, ACMG Policy Statement: Update Recommendations
Regarding Analysis and Reporting of Secondary Findings in Clinic Genome-Scale Sequencing, 17
GENETICS MED. 68, 68 (2015) (https://www.nature.com/articles/gim2014151). The original
ACMG guidelines, however, have received criticism from the bioethics community. See, e.g.,
Susan M. Wolf, George J. Annas & Sherman Elias, Patient Autonomy and Incidental Findings in
Clinical Genomics, 340 SCI. 1049, 1049 (2013) (suggesting that “[t]he ethical and legal problems
raised [by the guidance] are profound”). The year after issuing the 2013 guidelines, the
ACMG walked them back somewhat, adding an opt-out provision. Press Release, Am. Coll.
of Med. Genetics & Genomics, ACMG Updates Recommendation on “Opt Out” for Genome
Sequencing Return of Results (Apr. 1, 2014) (https://www.acmg.net/docs/Release_
ACMGUpdatesRecommendations_final.pdf). The guidelines now provide that, “[a]t the
time of testing, the patient should be made aware that, regardless of the specific indication
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“[t]he recommendations essentially argue that laboratory personnel
have a professional obligation to conduct a comprehensive
evaluation of available test results to identify such clinically
significant findings.”120 The obligation falls to clinical laboratories
because of their professional position and expertise: they have
special knowledge of what kind of genetic information is likely to be
important to individual health and a special ability to uncover this
information.121 The authors explain further that the same “ethical
standard already governs clinical genetics practice”: “if a patient is
being evaluated for a . . . cardiac condition [for example], practice
standards . . . dictate that [the geneticist] should take . . . a family
history and search for patterns that reveal genetic predisposition to
[other diseases],” and communicate any findings to patients.122
Further, in various scenarios outside the health care context we
accept non-consensual disclosures or warnings as ethically
appropriate and even required. For example, we receive alarming
alerts on our phones when there has been criminal activity nearby,
or if we happen to be in a location that is likely to be affected by a
dangerous weather event such as a flood or tornado. Perhaps we
would rather not know that an armed robbery has been committed
in our community or that our neighborhood is likely to be affected
by severe flooding. However, given that we might not otherwise
learn of the danger until it is too late to act to mitigate or avert it,
officials have determined that they are at least permitted, if not
required, to deliver the warning. People may well find these
warnings to be obnoxious, annoying, or unnecessarily alarming,
but no one suggests (as far as I know) that they are unethical or that
it is inappropriate to subject people to them as a default.
One might object that alerts about criminal activity or weather
conditions are materially different because they are not personal in
the way that individual health results are. Although the former
for testing, laboratories will routinely analyze the sequence of a set of genes deemed to be
highly medically actionable so as to detect pathogenic variants that may predispose to a
severe but preventable outcome”; patients should also be informed “that, if desired, they
may opt out of such analysis”; “[h]owever, they should also be made aware at that time of
the ramifications of doing so.” ACMG Board of Directors, supra, at 69.
120. Amy L. McGuire, Steven Joffe, Barbara A. Koenig, Barbara B. Biesecker, Laurence
B. McCullough, Jennifer S. Blumenthal-Barby, Timothy Caulfield, Sharon F. Terry & Robert
C. Green, Ethics and Genomic Incidental Findings, 340 SCI. 1047, 1047 (2013).
121. McGuire et al., supra note 120.
122. Id.
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types of warnings typically are impersonal, they certainly could be
personal—and making them so would not seem to affect their
acceptability. For example, suppose that an accident at an industrial
site results in high levels of chemicals in the air that are dangerous
for only specific groups of people—say, people with asthma over
the age of seventy-five or infants with respiratory issues. There may
be very few people in the affected area who fall into these
categories. Nevertheless, I suspect that people would generally find
it appropriate for residents to receive alerts about the danger.
The alerts might even be targeted such that only individuals most
likely to be affected would receive the alert, so as not to
unnecessarily alarm others. In this case the warning, and the threat,
are highly personal. Moreover, the risk is health related, just like
individual results uncovered in research. This kind of alert actually
raises privacy and confidentiality concerns that are not present to
the same extent in the return-of-results context, since individuals
who receive the alert might be able to infer the identity of others
who are subject to the risk, whereas in the context of human
subjects research, a participant would receive a warning about an
individual risk but others would not be informed of the risk to the
affected person.
One might object further that warnings about environmental
hazards are delivered by the government, and it is within the
government’s role, or the scope of the government-citizen
relationship, to promote the well-being of citizens and sometimes
even act paternalistically toward them, and so certain acts of
warning are justified if carried out by the government but not other
individuals or entities. For example, perhaps the government is
permitted, even required, to compel residents to get certain
vaccinations, but health professionals themselves could not
exercise that kind of control over people. Suppose, though, that the
government is not even aware of some danger—for example, a
health hazard associated with an industrial site. Maybe
environmental researchers discovered the hazard and were able to
identify the individuals who might be affected by it; affected
individuals might include not only nearby residents, but also people
working at the site and in the vicinity. In that scenario, it seems that
researchers should inform individuals who are at risk, even if that
would require relatively intrusive forms of notification, such as
leaving informational materials on people’s car windshields, at their
260
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homes, or even approaching them directly with the information.
That the researchers are not government actors would seem to make
little or no moral difference to the analysis.
Many similar scenarios can be imagined. For example, suppose
a retired meteorologist sells handmade jewelry on a beach in a resort
town. Suppose that, as a result of her expertise, the meteorologist
knows that there is a good chance that a severe storm will hit the
beach or that dangerous waves or currents will be present in the
ocean. It would seem to be unobjectionable, and indeed morally
praiseworthy if not required, for the weather expert to warn her
customers, even though they did not consent to such a warning and
even if they might prefer to remain ignorant. And the fact that the
meteorologist’s weather-related expertise is completely outside the
scope of the relationship between her and her customers does not
change the ethical analysis. Indeed, the relationship that the
meteorologist has with her customers seems to be beside the point.
It may be easier for her to warn her customers, since she is in direct
communication with them, and that might mean that she has a
stronger duty to warn them than others on the beach. However,
I would think that the meteorologist should make some kind of
effort to warn others as well. It is not a pre-established relationship
between the expert and other individuals that gives rise to a moral
duty or at least reason to warn, but rather the expert’s knowledge,
the asymmetry of her knowledge and the knowledge of others, and
the potential benefit that sharing her knowledge is likely to have
for them.123 One might insist that an off‑duty meteorologist is not
obligated to inform anyone about meteorological dangers, because
that would be asking too much of her; even if morality is not so
demanding, however, we can still accept that the meteorologist
would be praiseworthy for sharing her information with others in

123. Haavi Morreim, who was commissioned to write “a paper on the philosophical
perspectives and ethical underpinnings for the return of individual-specific research results
from research laboratories” for inclusion in the National Academies’ guide on returning
individual research results, makes a similar point in that paper. NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G.
& MED., supra note 53, at 354 (“[T]he main reason the investigator may have a specific, personal
duty to return an [individual finding] need not rely on any sort of professional relationship or
privileged access. It is enough that (1) the investigator is among the few who will actually see
the relevant data and (2) the investigator may be the only one who will recognize the
significance of such data for the individual research subject.”); see also Beskow & Burke, supra
note 53, at 1 (suggesting that in some (very limited) circumstances researchers will have a duty
to disclose individual results grounded in the general duty to rescue).
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an effort to prevent harm to them. In that case, the act would be
supererogatory, which is to say “morally good although not
(strictly) required.”124
More generally, we tend to take for granted that people who
have a special ability to help others in certain ways as a result of
their training and expertise have a responsibility to actually help
others in that way, even when the help is outside the scope of their
relationship with those who would benefit from it, and even in
circumstances when they are not otherwise acting in their
professional capacity. For example, we expect physicians to help
others in medical emergencies in both public and private settings,
even when they are off duty. Although less well-established,
I would think that lawyers have a similar responsibility to help an
individual in a “legal” emergency. For example, if a lawyer
witnesses an individual receiving a deportation order from a
government official and it seems that the individual might believe
that she must proceed to leave the country as soon as possible, then
the lawyer should inform her that she has legal options, including
the right to contest the order.125 Experts carry their expertise with
them even when they are not on the job, and the privilege of
possessing special knowledge and skill comes with responsibilities
to help others, people who do not possess the same knowledge or
skill, but whose well-being may depend on it.
Sharing information in these situations matches individual
need with benefit. In the context of human subjects research, for
many participants no individual results will be uncovered, but
through their participation all individuals would get the benefit of
some probability of receiving important health results.126 Those
124. David Heyd, Supererogation, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
(Edward N. Zalta ed., Winter 2019 ed.) https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/
entries/supererogation/.
125. Deportation, USAGOV, https://www.usa.gov/deportation (last updated Aug.
18, 2021) (explaining that an individual who receives a deportation order can appeal the
order and can also “file a complaint with the Department of Homeland Security” if the
individual “feel[s] that [their] civil rights have been violated in the immigration, detention,
or removal proceedings”).
126. For this reason, a policy in favor of returning individual results, should they arise,
helps researchers to meet the demands of the principle of justice in the bioethics context,
which requires that those who participate in the research, or their communities, stand to
benefit from the research conducted rather than the benefits accruing mainly or only to, for
example, better-off populations. See, e.g., Ruqaiijah Yearby, Exploitation in Medical Research:
The Enduring Legacy of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, 67 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 1171, 1183 (2017)
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who stand to benefit the most from the return of results would be
the ones to receive them. Researchers are in a privileged and
possibly even unique position to offer a benefit in the form of
important health results. Indeed, a study might be the participants’
only chance to receive the type of individual results that the
researchers uncover. In this sense, the warning is not a fungible
commodity. Individuals might not be able to obtain the information
through other means, even if they were willing and able to pay for
it. This was the case with COVID-19, for example, when the
demand for testing far exceeded capacity.127 The special and
sometimes unique access that researchers have to individual results
contributes to the moral reason that researchers have to offer this
type of benefit in particular to participants.
As Ernest Weinrib argues, we should keep the duty to warn or
rescue distinct from “the broader duty of beneficence”: “In the
rescue context,” he explains, “the resource to be expended (time
and effort directed at aiding the victim) cannot be traded on
the market, and no administrative scheme could be established
to ensure the socially desirable level of benefits.”128 This helps
to explain why researchers could not fulfill their obligations to
participants by paying them the monetary equivalent of the return
of results. There may not be any monetary equivalent because there
may be no way for participants to pay other actors to find and
disclose the same results on the same timeline.
Compared to the analogous scenarios discussed here, the
human subjects research context may present the strongest case for
a duty on the part of experts to disclose information that could
benefit the recipients. This is because researchers might owe
participants the information not only as a result of the researchers’
expertise and unique access to important information, but also
because the researchers are indebted to participants for their
contribution to research, whether that contribution was knowing
and voluntary or not—and perhaps especially if it was not, as I
explain below.129

(explaining that the bioethics principle of justice requires that if a population serves as
research subjects for the studies, that population should receive a benefit from the research).
127. See supra note 11.
128. Ernest J. Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE L.J. 247, 272 (1980).
129. See infra Section III.D.
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By returning results to participants, researchers show not only
that they care about participants’ wellbeing, but also that they
respect participants’ autonomy and right to be informed of
available information that concerns their own health.
B. The Law of Informing
In the U.S., unlike in many other countries, we have no general
legal duty to warn through the provision of information, nor do we
have a general legal duty to rescue or aid those we know are in
danger.130 But we do have some legal duties to help others who are
in danger or at risk. The duty arises most often in the context of
certain pre-existing relationships, but the relationship can be
minimal and fleeting, and the risk need not be a product of the
relationship. For example, the operators of “common carriers,”
such as buses and trains, have a duty to help a passenger who is in
danger, even when the danger was not caused by the common
carrier and would have affected the individual wherever they
happened to be at the time.131 As Claire Radcliffe explains,
[I]t is the rescuer’s ability to rescue coupled with the victim’s
dependency on the rescuer that gives rise to the duty [to aid or
rescue]. . . . In such a situation, the defendant is thought to hold
some power or control over the plaintiff since “the defendant has
the opportunity to take certain precautions to decrease the
probability that harm will come to the plaintiff.”132

130. For a detailed discussion about the state of the law in the U.S., see Zachary
Kaufman, Protectors of Predators or Prey: Bystanders and Upstanders amid Sexual Crimes, 92 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1317 (2019). Kaufman notes that, although there is no general federal law
requiring bystanders to crimes or other crises to report the situation to authorities or help
victims directly, such “Bad Samaritan” laws do “exist in one form or another in the majority
of states”: five states have some kind of legal duty to rescue, but only three of these apply to
non-criminal causes of harm, and the harm must be “grave” and “physical.” Id. at 1344–47.
131. See, Searcy v. Interurban Transp. Co., 179 So. 75 (1938) (holding that a
transportation company is liable for failing to secure medical attention for an ill bus
passenger even though the carrier did not cause the passenger’s condition); Coates v.
Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 297 F. Supp. 3d 69 (holding that a bus driver has a duty
of care to the bus passengers to take measures to protect them from the criminal conduct
of others); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 344 (explaining that businesses have
a duty of reasonable care to persons exposed to risks from the conduct of third parties on
business premises).
132. Claire Elaine Radcliffe, A Duty to Rescue: The Good, the Bad and the Indifferent—The
Bystander’s Dilemma, 13 PEPP. L. REV. 387, 395–96 (1986) (quoting Note, The Duty to Rescue in
Tort Law: Implications of Research on Altruism, 55 IND. L.J. 551, 553 (1980)).
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The Restatement of Torts lists numerous types of relationships
that may give rise to a duty to aid or warn and suggests that there
may be yet other relations beyond those listed that come with such
a duty.133 The Restatement notes further that “[t]he law appears . . . to
be working . . . toward[s] a recognition of the duty to aid or protect
in any relation of dependence . . . .”134 And, as other scholars have
observed, “courts have . . . opened the door to a [duty to disclose]
for researchers . . . .”135
In the case of Grimes, the court relied on the contractual
relationship between researcher and participant as the central basis
for the duty to inform participants of health-relevant results. But
the court also suggested that such a duty might arise even in the
absence of a contract: “A special relationship giving rise to duties,
the breach of which might constitute negligence, might also arise
because, generally, the investigators are in a better position to
anticipate, discover, and understand the potential risks to the
health of their subjects.”136 And other courts have held that “[a]
duty to warn exists when there is ‘unequal knowledge and the
defendant, possessed of such knowledge, knows or should know
that harm might occur if no warning is given.’”137 A Federal District
Court determined that a hospital physician who was in charge of a
program to research the effects of a radiation treatment that had been
given to the hospital’s former patients had a duty to inform
individuals about negative effects of that treatment, even though he
had never had physician-patient relationships with them.138

133. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 40.
134. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A, caveat & cmt. B; see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS § 40 (asserting that certain “special relationships” give rise to duties of care
and that “the term ‘special relationship’ has no independent significance[,]” but “merely
signifies that courts recognize an affirmative duty arising out of the relationship where
otherwise no duty would exist”; and explaining that “[w]hether a relationship is deemed
special is a conclusion based on reasons of principle or policy[,]” and “[n]o algorithm exists
to provide clear guidance about which policies in which proportions justify the imposition
of an affirmative duty based on a relationship”).
135. Gordon, supra note 35, at 226.
136. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 851. For a discussion of the Grimes case, see supra Section
II.B.1.a.
137. Blaz v. Michael Reese Hosp. Found., 74 F. Supp. 2d 803, 805 (N.D. Ill. 1999)
(quoting Kokoyachuk v. Aeroquip Corp., 526 N.E.2d 607, 610 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988)). See Fatehi
& Hall, supra note 68, at 627–29, for a discussion of the case and its implications for duties of
researchers to return results.
138. Blaz, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 806–07.
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“[P]lacing the burden [to inform] on the [researcher/physician] . . . is
the only decision that makes sense,” the judge explained, “since Dr.
Schneider was in a special position to acquire the information and
had in fact done so, while [the plaintiff] was in no position to find
out.”139 Likewise, in Safer v. Pack, the Superior Court of New Jersey
determined that a physician who possesses knowledge about a
patient that has significant health implications for family members
of the patient will sometimes have a duty to inform the family
members, even if they are not his patients.140 In this case, the patient
had a life-threatening and possibly preventable genetic disease, and
the physician knew or should have known that the patient’s child
would be at substantial risk of developing the disease.141
Turning to a different medical context, clinical psychologists
who learn that their own patients are a danger to third parties have
a legal duty to warn those in danger. This duty was first and most
famously recognized in the case of Tarasoff v. Regents of the
University of California, where the California Supreme Court held
that, “[w]hen a therapist determines, or pursuant to the standards
of his profession should determine, that his patient presents a
serious danger of violence to another, he incurs an obligation to use
reasonable care to protect the intended victim against such
danger.”142 As Béatrice Godard explains, “[t]he duty to warn [in the
Tarasoff scenario] has been interpreted as a duty to act to prevent
foreseeable harm.”143 The reasons against warning in a case like
139. Id. at 806.
140. Safer v. Estate of Pack, 677 A.2d 1188, 1192 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996)
(“declin[ing] to hold . . . that, in all circumstances, the duty to warn will be satisfied by
informing the patient[,]” and asserting that “[w]e see no impediment, legal or otherwise, to
recognizing a physician’s duty to warn those known to be at risk of avoidable harm from a
genetically transmissible condition.”). The New Jersey legislature, however, responded to
this decision with a statutory amendment that would seem to impose such a legal
impediment. See New Jersey Genetic Privacy Act, Pub. L. 96, ch. 126 (Nov. 19, 1996) (codified
as N.J. Stat. § 10:5-44(2)(b)) (providing that “[g]enetic information is personal information
that should not be . . . disclosed without the individual’s authorization.”)
141. Safer, 677 A.2d at 1190.
142. Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 431 (1976).
143. Béatrice Godard, Thierry Hurlimann, Martin Letendre, Nathalie Égalité &
INHERIT BRCAs, Guidelines for Disclosing Genetic Information to Family Members: From
Development to Use, 5 FAMILIAL CANCER 103, 105 (2006). Thomas Murphy suggests that a
lawyer should also have a legal duty to warn in the event that a client poses a danger to third
parties. Thomas J. Murphy, Affirmative Duties in Tort Following Tarasoff, 58 ST. JOHN’S L. REV.
492, 525 (1984). The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct permit lawyers to reveal
otherwise confidential information “to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial
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this are much stronger than reasons against warning in the
hypothetical scenarios I sketched in section III.A and the human
subjects research context as well. This is because health-care
providers owe strong duties of care and confidentiality to their
patients. Informing others of the medical conditions or thoughts of
patients infringes patient rights to privacy and confidentiality and
may have adverse consequences on clinical care; for example,
patients may become less inclined to seek out care or disclose
information relevant to their care with their providers. In the
human subjects research context, the researchers would not be
sharing personal information with third parties likely to be
affected by it.
Moreover, in the clinical psychology context, informing others
of the expressed desires or intentions of clients can put them at risk
of non-voluntary institutionalization, for what may or may not be
a real intention to harm others. Nevertheless, it seems that a
therapist does have a moral duty to warn others in the event she
reasonably believes there is a non-trivial risk that her client will
harm another person, and that courts were justified in creating a
legal duty as well. This is because the therapist is likely in a unique
position to prevent serious harm.144 As other scholars have
observed, statutes and judicial decisions compel the disclosure of
sensitive health-related information to the affected individual as
well as third parties in various other contexts as well.145
bodily harm.” MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(1) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020). Some states
have Rules of Professional Conduct requiring lawyers to reveal information to prevent certain
types of harm to third parties. See, e.g., Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 1.6(c) (2021) ("A lawyer shall reveal
information relating to the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably
believes necessary to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm.").
144. The Privacy Rule of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA) permits a health care provider to disclose private health information about a patient
if the provider believes that the disclosure “[i]s necessary to prevent or lessen a serious and
imminent threat to the health or safety of a person or the public.” 45 C.F.R.
§ 164.512(j)(1)(i)(A) (2020). See OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES, FAQ: Does HIPAA Permit a Doctor to Contact a Patient’s Family or Law
Enforcement if the Doctor Believes that the Patient Might Hurt Herself or Someone Else? (Sept. 12,
2017),
https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/faq/2096/does-hipaa-permitdoctor-contact-patients-family-or-law-enforcement-if-doctor-believes-patient.html.
Likewise, the Privacy Act permits federal agencies to disclose confidential personal records
without consent “to a person pursuant to a showing of compelling circumstances affecting
the health or safety of an individual.” 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(8) (2018).
145. See, e.g., Benjamin E. Berkman, Refuting the Right Not to Know, 19 J. HEALTH CARE
L. & POL’Y 1, 41–45 (2016) (discussing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 35, which permits
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A legal duty to return certain individual results in the context
of human subjects research would seem consistent with decisions
that courts have reached in analogous contexts. As Susan Wolf and
coauthors explain, “[i]ncluding among researcher duties an
obligation to offer to disclose to participants [findings] that have
likely health or reproductive importance is consistent not only with
legal recognition of researchers’ special obligations toward
participants, but also with legal doctrine imposing a duty to warn
of foreseeable harm.”146 On the other hand, though, there are also
reasons to resist any widespread recognition of a legal duty to
return results, including potential adverse effects that the threat of
liability might have on research.147 Whether or not the law should
compel researchers to inform participants of health-relevant
results, it should at the least not prevent or disincentivize
disclosure. After all, researchers might be in a unique position to
alert participants to significant health risks, as a result of the

courts to “order a party whose mental or physical condition—including blood group—is in
controversy to submit to a physical or mental examination by a suitably licensed or certified
examiner,” and noting that “examples of compelled genetic testing abound”; and discussing
laws requiring pregnant women seeking abortion “to be given specific information about
their fetus[es]”); Gitter, supra note 111, at 382–83 (discussing state partner notification
statutes that “impose[] an affirmative duty on every physician or health care provider
authorized to diagnose HIV/AIDS to report the positive status of individuals to the state
health commissioner along with the names of any identified spouse, sex partner, or needlesharing partner . . . so that listed partners may be notified,” but claiming that “[t]he analogy
to HIV exposure is not strong enough to justify contacting individuals to tell them directly
of their genetic imputed findings absent their informed consent.”).
146. Managing Incidental Findings, supra note 22, at 229; see also Law of Incidental Findings,
supra note 17, at 366–70 (discussing the Blaz case and asserting that “[s]ome recent case law
suggests that a legal trend may be emerging toward recognizing an obligation on the part of
a researcher to provide a research participant with information acquired from a study, when
that information has clinical implications for the participant”); Pike et al., supra note 75, at
795 (suggesting that a “possible source of an ethical obligation to return [individual results],
is the duty to rescue, which obligates an individual to act when presented with an
opportunity to alleviate the serious plight of another with minimal burden to oneself”).
147. See Koch, supra note 20, at 210–11 (acknowledging this concern, but also noting
that “offering the return of findings to research participants may increase public trust in the
research enterprise or even increase general awareness of research protocols, thereby leading
to more, rather than less, research participation,” and that “the threat of liability may not
have the chilling effect on research that some fear, because the risk of loss of funding or
suspension of research is already sufficiently threatening”); see also Michelle M. Mello, David
M. Studdert & Troyen A. Brennan, The Rise of Litigation in Human Subjects Research, 139 ANN.
INTERN. MED. 40, 40 (2003); Richard A. Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of
Medical Products, 82 VA. L. REV. 1753, 1847 (1996); Richard A. Epstein, Legal Liability for
Medical Innovation, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 1139, 1156 (1987).
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researchers’ professional expertise and special, perhaps even
unique, access to private information. And this is true regardless of
whether participants were given the opportunity up front to
consent to the return of results.
C. A Right Not to Know?
It would seem somewhat bizarre to insist that, because of a lack
of consent to receive information, individuals enjoying their time
on the beach should not be informed of environmental risks or that
someone in danger of being harmed by a psychologist’s patient
should not be informed about it. Instead, we generally accept that
experts should warn individuals of dangers, even if they have not
consented to the warning. The warning seems to be justified
because we assume that it is in the recipients’ best interests; and the
recipients’ autonomy is still respected because they can decide for
themselves what action, if any, to take in response to the warning.
Indeed, our default assumption in these scenarios seems to be that
people would want to receive the information, and that they will
respond—autonomously, according to their own values and
preferences—to it.
Of course, we can imagine how someone in each of the
aforementioned scenarios might prefer not to know, how the
knowledge might create anxiety, and how, ultimately, it might not
help them at all.148 An individual might have been better off never
knowing that they were exposed to some risk.149 For these reasons,
148. However, research has not uncovered evidence indicating that the receipt of
personal genetic information causes significant long-term psychosocial harm. See Berkman,
supra note 145, at 56–61 (citing studies that found long-term psychological harm of receiving
individual results is minimal, and also suggesting that there is little evidence of significant
economic harm in the form of genetic discrimination).
149. As Fatehi and Hall, supra note 68, at 603–04, assert, commentators and the
regulations “express concerns about the devastating psychological harms that a [participant]
might face when unexpectedly finding out that they may have a problem,” but minimize
“the devastating physical harms that a [participant] might face if they are not informed about
a problem they could avoid or mitigate had they been [informed]”: the “potential
psychological risks of disclosure are [unjustifiably] elevated over the medical, clinical, and
physical risks posed by non-disclosure.” See also Scholtes, supra note 35, at 1186 (asserting
that “the tangible and intangible costs of not returning incidental findings to participants can
be detrimental to society as well as the research enterprise,” and yet most of the literature
does not consider these costs); Gitter, supra note 111, at 377–78 (drawing attention to the costs
of not returning individual findings, including the “anguish that may arise when a [past
research participant] is diagnosed with a serious medical condition and realizes that it
could . . . have been caught and treated earlier,” if individual findings had been returned).
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bioethicists often refer to a right on the part of research participants
not to know about their own health-related risk factors. But if we
have no right not to know important health-relevant information in
other contexts, it would seem inconsistent to insist nevertheless on
a right not to know about individual findings that arise in the
context of human subjects research.
Scholars who endorse a right not to know insist that the
principle of autonomy requires it.150 It is unclear, however, why the
principle of autonomy should favor a right not to know over a right
to know, or why it would be more paternalistic to return results
than withhold them, especially given the empirical evidence
suggesting that research participants and prospective participants
generally want to receive results and place a high value on them.151
The prevailing insistence on the importance of protecting a
right not to know personal information obtained through
biomedical research might be described as biomedical
exceptionalism: a tendency to afford a special status to biomedical
information—or, more specifically, biomedical information
derived from biomedical research—without any compelling
justification for doing so.152 Given the empirical evidence
150. See Gitter, supra note 111, at 368 (“In the field of biomedical research, the principle
of autonomy, or self-determination, suggests that each individual has the right not to know
selected information about herself.”).
151. See, e.g., Breitkopf et al., supra note 113, at 469, 473 (2015) (finding that, “[c]onsistent
with other reports on return of genetic research results, most respondents desired their own
results and expected that researchers would extend an offer to learn them”; “[w]hen given a
choice between protecting an individual’s right not to know genetic results versus offering
results to all, fewer than one in five respondents favored the former, even at the risk of
upsetting some people by offering results” (emphasis added); and only fourteen percent
“agreed with the statement, ‘Researchers should NOT be required to offer genetic results
because it’s not their job’”); see also supra Section II.C. Other scholars have likewise suggested
that withholding individual results based on the belief that the information will harm
participants is unjustifiably paternalistic. See, e.g., Conrad Fernandez, Public Expectations for
Return of Results—Time to Stop Being Paternalistic?, 8 AM. J. BIOETHICS 46, 46–48 (2008)
(arguing that, despite the risks associated with returning results, researchers have duties to
disclose given participant preferences in favor of disclosure).
152. Many scholars have criticized “genetic exceptionalism,” which is the idea,
common among the general public, that personal genetic information is more sensitive and
warrants greater protections than other types of personal, health-related information. See
Miguel Ruiz-Canela & J. Ignacio Valle-Mansilla, What Research Participants Want to Know
About Genetic Research Results: The Impact of “Genetic Exceptionalism,” 6 J. EMPIRICAL RES. ON
HUM. RES. ETHICS 39, 42 (2011) (finding that people perceive individual genetic data to pose
greater risks than other types of health data); Glenn McGee, Forward: Genetic Exceptionalism,
11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 565, 565 (1998) (introducing a journal issue on genetic exceptionalism
and explaining that the articles converge around the common theme that “society may not
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suggesting that people want to receive results, and given that in
other contexts we generally approve of information disclosure even
in the absence of consent, the assumption that refraining from
disclosing results in biomedical research best protects participant
interests and autonomy is untenable.
I do not mean to suggest that results should be forced on
people. If a participant expressly declines an offer to receive
individual results, then their wish should generally be respected.
To defy someone’s wishes in that scenario would be extremely
intrusive and probably indefensible. Issues of timing and
comprehension complicate matters, however, since participants
might rotely sign a consent form in advance of a study that
indicates they will not receive results, and nevertheless wish to
receive a result that arises in the course of research.
In practice, investigators typically do not give participants the
opportunity, in advance of the research, to choose whether or not
to receive results.153 Ideally, participants would be given the chance
to opt out, in a reasonably informed way, of receiving results. Even
if participants were afforded this chance, however, the empirical
evidence strongly suggests that the vast majority would not opt
out.154 And so, while perhaps one should ultimately have the right

always benefit from special genetic and reproduction regulations, or special ‘exceptions’ to
existing policies for genetics”). In this Article, I call attention to the broader phenomenon of
biomedical exceptionalism, which treats personal biomedical information derived from
human subjects research as morally distinct from other types of personal information. As far
as I know, this form of exceptionalism has not been discussed in the literature.
153. See supra Section II.C.
154. No studies, as far as I am aware, have examined how many participants do or
would opt out of receiving individual results, but evidence about people’s preferences
regarding the return of results suggests that opting out would be exceedingly rare. See
supra Section II.C.
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to refuse the receipt of results155, we should not by default assume
that research participants wish to exercise that right.156
D. Non-Consensual Research
The bulk of the scholarly literature suggests that, whereas
researchers have certain duties to return results in the context of
consensual research, any such duties may be weaker or nonexistent in
the context of non-consensual research (or even broad-consent-based
research).157 This section argues to the contrary that researchers have
some strong reasons to return results specifically in the case of
research for which informed consent was not obtained.
Many scholars have suggested that the participant’s voluntary
agreement to participate in the research creates the ethical reasons
that weigh in favor of returning results.158 In my view, however,
researchers have compelling ethical reasons to return results even
in the absence of voluntary participation. Indeed, the reasons might
be even stronger when participation is non-consensual, because the
researchers incur a greater debt to participants. When participants
155. See, e.g., Miller et al., supra note 48, at 277 (asserting that, “[i]f a subject has
explicitly indicated that she does not want to receive incidental findings, this preference
should surely be honored”); Managing Incidental Findings, supra note 22, at 233 (stating that
the right of participants “not to know certain categories of information . . . is well-recognized
in the genetics literature”); Ebony B. Bookman, Aleisha A. Langehorne, John H. Eckfeldt,
Kathleen C. Glass, Gail P. Jarvik, Michael Klag, Greg Koski, Arno Motulsky, Benjamin
Wilfond, Teri A. Manolio, Richard R. Fabsitz & Russell V. Luepker, Reporting Genetic Results
in Research Studies: Summary and Recommendations of an NHLBI Working Group, 140 AM. J. MED.
GENETICS PART A 1033, 1038 (2006) (stating that “[r]esearch study participants should be
given the opportunity [at the consent stage] to decline receiving genetic results and remain
eligible for participation if receiving the results is not central to the conduct of the research”);
UNESCO General Conference, International Declaration on Human Genetic Rights, art. 10 (Oct.
16,
2003),
https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000133171.page=45
(“[T]he
information provided at the time of consent should indicate that the person concerned has
the right to decide whether or not to be informed of the results.”); Fernandez, et al., supra
note 41 (asserting that “[p]articipants have the right to decline receiving all or part of research
results”); GRAEME LAURIE, GENETIC PRIVACY: A CHALLENGE TO MEDICO-LEGAL NORMS 203–
11 (2004) (same); G.A. Res. 53/152, Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and
Human
Rights,
art. 5(c)
(Dec.
9,
1998),
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/
ProfessionalInterest/Pages/HumanGenomeAndHumanRights.aspx (same).
156. Upon uncovering an individual result, it would be appropriate to ask the affected
person whether they wish to receive it before disclosing the finding itself; for reasons I
explained above, however, this gesture is unlikely to satisfy proponents of a strong right not
to know. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
157. See supra Section II.A.1.
158. See supra Section II.A.1.
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consent to a study, they often receive some kind of remuneration for
their participation. Various psychic and emotional benefits are also
associated with participating in research.159 Participants can feel
good about contributing to the research enterprise. And they might
gain some social capital—respect, gratitude, and admiration—for
their participation. Non-consensual participants do not enjoy any of
the benefits of willingly contributing to research.
Moreover, willing participants autonomously waive certain
rights by consenting to the research—in particular, rights that they
would otherwise have to keep their personal biomedical
information, such as disease status and DNA, private. Since
voluntary participants waive certain privacy rights, researchers do
not violate or infringe those rights when they perform tests on
biological samples that reveal sensitive, personal information. In
the case of research without participant consent, participants do not
waive any privacy rights and researchers violate or at least infringe
participants’ privacy rights in conducting research on their
biospecimens and data without consent.160 Researchers in some
sense then owe more to participants who did not consent to the
research. By offering to return health-relevant results, the
researchers would recognize the unwitting participants’ own
independent interests, rather than treating them merely as means
to realizing research goals. In this way, the researchers can
demonstrate respect for participants even if informed consent to the
research was not, for whatever reason, obtained.
We can imagine a possible society in which consent for
participating in research is not ethically required, but that society is
not ours. For example, imagine a society in which it was common
159. See, e.g., Parker, supra note 27, at 346 (noting that indirect benefits of participating
willingly in biomedical research include “personal satisfaction derived from altruism” as
well as “medical testing and care that may be part of the research protocol”).
160. If you have a right to X, and I prevent you from getting X, then I violate your right
if and only if it is morally impermissible for me to prevent you from getting X. If I am
permitted to prevent you from getting X, which would be true if I have a moral justification
for it, then I infringe but do not violate your right. See, e.g., JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON,
SELF-DEFENSE AND RIGHTS 9–10 (1976) (discussing the rights violation/infringement
distinction). The informed consent requirement in the context of human subjects research is
widely accepted in the bioethics literature, and I won’t attempt to advance my own argument
for it here. The idea, basically, is that researchers may not intervene in an individual’s private
sphere for research purposes without first obtaining the individual’s informed consent to the
intervention. See Nir Eyal, Informed Consent, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Sep.
20, 2011), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2012/entries/informed-consent/.
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knowledge that everyone’s medical health records and biological
samples, even if originally collected for purposes of personal health
care, would be reused for undisclosed research purposes. And
suppose that research using these materials was regulated such that
only studies that are equitable, consistent with public values, and
likely to produce public benefit would be permitted. In this kind of
society, we would likely see greater public trust in the health care
system and in biomedical research than our own, which might help
obviate the need for consent to research.161 In the United States today,
however, people generally expect to be asked whether they would
be willing to participate in biomedical research, and they prefer to be
asked—expectations and preferences that are informed by a history
of unethical research practices and by the emphasis that bioethicists
have put in the past forty years or so on the importance of informed
consent in human subjects research.162 Given this backdrop,
161. See Stephanie A. Kraft, Mildred K. Cho, Katherine Gillespie, Meghan Halley, Nina
Varsava, Kelly E. Ormond, Harold S. Luft, Benjamin S. Wilfond & Sandra Soo-Jin Lee, Beyond
Consent: Building Trusting Relationships with Diverse Populations in Precision Medicine Research,
18 AM. J. OF BIOETHICS 3, 13 (2018) (describing how a history of discrimination against racial
and ethnic minorities in the United States has led to distrust in biomedical research and the
health care system); Angeliki Kerasidou, Trust Me, I’m a Researcher!: The Role of Trust in
Biomedical Research, 20 MED., HEALTH CARE & PHIL. 43, 46 (2017) (observing that “[t]he long
list of scandals in biomedical research, from the Nazi doctors’ experiments to the more recent
cases . . . , it has been argued, has undermined public trust in it” and explaining that “[t]he
introduction of laws and rules to regulate biomedical research, and the promotion of
transparency and accountability has been seen as . . . a way to reinstate and promote
trustworthiness”).
162. See, e.g., Mildred K. Cho, David Magnus, Melissa Constantine, Sandra Soo-Jin Lee,
Maureen Kelley, Stephanie Alessi, Diane Korngiebel, Cyan James, Ellen Kuwana, Thomas
H. Gallagher, Douglas Diekema, Alexander M. Capron, Steven Joffe & Benjamin S. Wilfond,
Attitudes Toward Risk and Informed Consent for Research on Medical Practices: A Cross-Sectional
Survey, 162 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 690, 694 (2015) (finding that people prefer that
researchers ask for their permission before using their medical records in research, and
noting that “[their] findings are consistent with other studies that reveal broad support for,
and willingness to participate in, research but also a strong desire to be asked for permission
before research using medical records, biospecimens, or cluster randomization”); Barbara J.
Evans, In Search of Sound Policy on Nonconsensual Uses of Identifiable Health Data, in HUMAN
SUBJECTS RESEARCH REGULATION: PERSPECTIVES ON THE FUTURE 265, 271 (I. Glenn Cohen &
Holly Fernandez Lynch eds., 2014) (noting that “[s]urveys reveal that members of the public
are troubled by nonconsensual access to their data”); Kraft et al., supra note 161 (finding that
members of the general public believe that consent is necessary (but not sufficient) for
protecting the rights and interests of biomedical research participants); PRESIDENTIAL
COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, INFORMED CONSENT BACKGROUND (2016),
https://bioethicsarchive.georgetown.edu/pcsbi/sites/default/files/1%20Informed%20Co
nsent%20Background%209.30.16.pdf (asserting that “[i]nformed consent is not only part of,
but is arguably the cornerstone of the conduct of ethical human subjects research,” and
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individuals generally have a right to decide whether or not to
participate in research.
This is not to say that non-consensual research is never
permissible. It may be justified in circumstances where the benefit
of the research is likely to be great and the cost of obtaining consent
prohibitive. In that event, the researchers would merely infringe,
rather than violate, participants’ rights by denying them the
opportunity to consent to the research. That would not mean,
however, that researchers owe nothing to individuals to
compensate for the rights infringement. A classic example from the
moral philosophy literature helps to illustrate the point:
Suppose that you are on a backpacking trip in the high mountain
country when an unanticipated blizzard strikes the area with such
ferocity that your life is imperiled. Fortunately, you stumble onto
an unoccupied cabin, locked and boarded up for the winter,
clearly somebody else’s private property. You smash in a
window, enter, and huddle in a corner for three days until the
storm abates. During this period you help yourself to your
unknown benefactor’s food supply and burn his wooden
furniture in the fireplace to keep warm.163

Even though your actions in the blizzard hypothetical are
permissible, you have infringed on someone’s rights (in this case,
property rights), and you owe them some kind of meaningful
compensation to make up for the infringement. 164 Likewise, in the
case of non-consensual research using individuals’ personal
health data or biospecimens, even if the lack of consent was
permissible, researchers owe something to participants to make
up for infringing their rights. If research is consensual, researchers
do not owe participants any compensation for infringing their
rights, since no rights were infringed. In this sense, nonconsensual participants have a greater claim than consensual ones
to compensation from researchers.
Henry Richardson, who argues that researchers’ duties to
return individual results arise from the participant’s willing waiver
explaining that informed consent is a central theme of The Belmont Report, which the National
Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research
issued in 1978 “to serve as a guide for ethical human subjects research”).
163. Joel Feinberg, Voluntary Euthanasia and the Inalienable Right to Life, 7 PHIL. & PUB.
AFFS. 93, 102 (1978).
164. Id.; see also THOMSON, supra note 160, at 8.
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of privacy rights, presents an analogy to a scenario in which one
person permits another to borrow her car. “By accepting the
owner’s waiver of” the right to exclusive use of her car, Richardson
explains, the borrower takes “on some moral responsibility” to take
care of the car.165 For example, if the car is damaged while in the
borrower’s possession, even if through no fault of his own,
the borrower has some responsibility to tend to the damage.
By emphasizing the role of the car owner’s grant of permission in
creating the borrower’s duties of care, Richardson suggests that
someone who uses another’s car without permission would have
lesser or no duties of care with respect to the car. It seems to me,
however, that someone who does not get permission subsumes not
lesser but greater related duties of care.
For example, suppose that I borrow my neighbor’s car in an
emergency situation without obtaining her consent. It seems that,
in such a case, I would have a stronger moral duty to take care of
any damage the car sustained while in my possession than if I had
obtained her permission in advance. This is because, if she had
granted me permission to use her car, she would have willingly
taken on some risk that harm would befall the car while I was using
it. And, assuming that I did not assure her I would rectify any
damages, she would have assumed some risk that damages would
not be repaired. If, however, I borrowed my neighbor’s car without
her permission, she has assumed no risk and has no responsibility
for anything that happens to the car while in my possession. To
make up for my infringement of her property rights, I would owe
it to her not only to return the car in the shape I found it, but also to
compensate her in some nontrivial way for infringing on her rights.
This is analogous to the research setting, in that a researcher who
does not obtain the consent of participants has greater moral duties
of care and compensation toward them as a result. The analogy
illustrates why Richardson and others are mistaken in grounding
researchers’ duties of care and compensation in the consent process
or the participant’s voluntary participation.166

165. HENRY S. RICHARDSON, MORAL ENTANGLEMENTS: THE ANCILLARY-CARE
OBLIGATIONS OF MEDICAL RESEARCHERS 88 (2012).
166. For a review of literature that grounds duties to return results in consent and
voluntary participation, see supra Section II.A.1.
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E. Expectations
Certain considerations that weigh in favor of the return of results
in consensual research scenarios do not apply to non-consensual
research. First, participants who consented to a study might expect
to receive certain results—perhaps only those related to the primary
research questions—and might even rely on that expectation.167 The
potential for expectations and reliance might contribute to
researchers duties to return individual results.168 For example, if
individuals participate in a genetic study and they do not receive any
results, they might assume that they do not have any genetic risk
factors, which might be harmful to them if in fact they do have such
risk factors. It is unclear whether and in what research settings
consensual participants in fact develop expectations about receiving
results, especially if the consent materials are silent on the issue.169
Regardless, we can be certain that research participants who are not
aware of their participation would not expect to receive results. The
potential expectations of consensual participants provide an
independent reason for researchers to return individual findings in
the context of consensual research. The lack of an expectation interest
on the part of non-consensual participants, however, does not negate
the independent considerations that weigh in favor of returning
results to them.
Second, if we consider the universe of consensual research,
researchers will have an additional reason to return results to
participants in the event that participants were expressly informed
in advance that results would be returned. The participants’
reasonable expectations of receiving results are highest in this
167. See, e.g., Managing Incidental Findings, supra note 22, at 228 (suggesting that
“researchers’ silence on the topic of clinical problems may be misinterpreted by research
participants as a clean bill of health”).
168. See Varsava, supra note 49, for a discussion of this point.
169. One study found that sixty-three percent of participants in a cancer biobank and
associated family registry “expected to learn something about their own genetic results,” but
it is unclear whether the consent form said anything about the return of results. Breitkopf et
al., supra note 113, at 469 (quoting the study). In a survey study querying previous
participants of brain imaging studies about their expectations and preferences regarding the
return of incidental findings, fifty-one percent of medical-setting participants and sixty-three
percent of non-medical-setting participants “reported that if a brain abnormality existed they
would expect it to be detected.” Kirschen, et al., supra note 115. The consent forms for the
studies that the survey respondents were involved in apparently did not indicate that
investigators would search for abnormalities but did state that if an abnormality was
detected on a participant’s scan, the participant would be informed about it. Id.
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context, as is the probability that they will rely on those
expectations. Moreover, failing to return results in this consent
scenario is blameworthy for the reason that it would violate an
agreement between researcher and participant—which may count
legally as a contract and morally as a promise. If participants were
not given the opportunity to consent to the return of results in
advance, there would be no such agreement to be broken.
These two considerations show how the reasons weighing in
favor of returning results vary somewhat across different consent
contexts. But none of this suggests that only those researchers who
obtain advanced participant consent to the disclosure of results
should disclose them.
F. Costs to Researchers
Despite the reasons that weigh in favor of returning results, in
some scenarios the cost of tracking down participants and
communicating results to them may be so high that we cannot
expect researchers to absorb it.170 We should keep in mind, though,
that the amount of resources available to researchers to run a given
study is a function of the budget that the researchers estimate in
advance. Currently, researchers have no regulatory reason to
budget for the return of results and even have significant reason not
to budget for this eventuality, given restrictions on planning to
return results.171 Indeed the regulations create incentives for
researchers to refrain from including plans to return results in their
study protocols and so to refrain from requesting grant funding for
that purpose. As a result, researchers might find themselves in a
situation where they wish to return results but do not have the
resources to do so responsibly.172
Perhaps funding bodies should take some of the burden upon
themselves and earmark funds to support the return of results.
170. As Pilar N. Ossorio, Letting the Gene Out of the Bottle: A Comment on Returning
Individual Research Results to Participants, 6 AM. J. BIOETHICS 24, 25 (2006) explains, “the
practicalities of returning results may impose untenable burdens on the existing research
infrastructure”; in large-scale, longitudinal, genome sequencing studies in particular,
“[r]eporting back all of the useful results would be extraordinarily costly in time and money.”
171. See supra Section II.B.
172. As Scholtes, supra note 35, at 1204 asserts, “researchers should address this issue
prior to applying for funding.” See also Terry, supra note 14, at 734 (noting that “costs for
creating and maintaining systems that allow individuals to detail how and when they want
results to be reported back to them [could] be built into grants”).
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Another possibility, which raises some privacy concerns that would
have to be addressed, is that a government agency makes decisions
about the return of individual results. Researchers would inform the
agency of any health-relevant results uncovered in the course of
research, and then the agency would have the responsibility of
determining whether the benefits of disclosure justify the costs.
The agency could even carry the burden of conveying the results to
individuals and covering the associated expenses.
Another possible solution to the cost problem would be to
require insurance companies to reimburse the costs associated with
the return of results. If receiving results amounts to a type of
preventive care, then insurance companies arguably already have
duties under the Affordable Care Act to cover the costs.173 With the
passing of the ACA, many Americans became eligible for expanded
coverage of preventive services, with the goal of improving overall
health and wellbeing.174 Access to preventive services may
ultimately lower overall health care costs.175
In any event, I do not mean to argue for an absolute duty to
return individual results regardless of costs.176 Other scholars have
proposed frameworks and rules for weighing costs and benefits of

173. This should be taken as a highly tentative suggestion, which would require
substantial further research to assess.
174. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C.S. § 300gg-13 (2018)
(providing that “[a] group health plan and a health insurance issuer offering group or
individual health insurance coverage shall, at a minimum provide coverage for and shall not
impose any cost sharing requirements for [certain preventive services, including
screening]”). For a discussion of the ACA’s preventive medicine provisions, see Amy Burke
& Adelle Simmons, Increased Coverage of Preventive Services with Zero Cost Sharing Under the
Affordable Care Act, ASPE Issue Brief (U.S. Dep’t Health & Hum. Servs.) 1 (June 27, 2014).
175. See Natalia Olchanski, Joshua T. Cohen & Peter J. Neumann, A Role for Research:
An Observation on Preventive Services for Women, 44 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. S12, S15 (2013)
(finding that “[t]here is some evidence that better access to preventive services can be
maintained at a reasonable cost to the healthcare system, and that certain services may even
lower healthcare costs”); Michael V. Maciosek, Ashley B. Coffield, Thomas J. Flottemesch,
Nichol M. Edwards & Leif I. Solberg, Greater Use of Preventive Services in U.S. Health Care
Could Save Lives at Little or No Cost, 29 HEALTH AFFS. 1656, 1660 (2010) (concluding that
increased use of preventive medicine is a good use of scarce resources, improves overall
health, and is “essentially cost-neutral”).
176. In many situations the cost to researchers of returning individual results may be
relatively low. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 35, at 247 (noting that, when it comes to “a finding
with a high degree of clinical utility,” “the burdens [of disclosure] are likely to pale in
comparison to the benefits,” at least if we assume “that the duty could be discharged by
simply informing the subject of the finding”).
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disclosing results and determining on that basis when disclosure is
ethically advisable; further research along these lines is needed.177
G. Regulatory Reform
Researchers often do not obtain consent to the return of results
in advance of studies. This is a practice that the regulations in
various ways encourage. The recommendations in the bioethics
literature, however, are largely based on the assumption that
researchers will obtain consent to the return of results in advance.
In this respect the scope of the ethics literature is limited.
This Article argues that researchers will often have strong ethical
reasons to return results even in the absence of advanced consent
to that effect, and that the law and policy governing human subjects
research is misdirected to the extent that it prohibits or
disincentivizes researchers from returning results. Policy makers
need to make space in the regulations for the appropriate return of
results, including in settings where no advanced consent to return
was obtained.178 In this sense, I am arguing for a relaxation of the
regulatory requirements. Many details remain to be worked out,
however, including just which results warrant disclosure and how
the disclosure should be orchestrated.
As we saw above,179 the issue of returning individual results has
mobilized
numerous
working
groups
to
produce
recommendations for investigators who uncover individual results
in the course of research. These groups should turn their attention
to non-ideal consent settings and develop guidelines for
investigators operating in these settings. In particular, we need
multidisciplinary groups that include bioethicists; biomedical
researchers; geneticists; physicians; and other stakeholders,
including research participants themselves, to delimit with more
specificity which results qualify as health-relevant for the purposes
of disclosure. A major challenge is that the health-relevant result is
a moving target; more findings will qualify as science and medicine
progress, and guidelines will have to be updated accordingly.

177. See, e.g., Scholtes, supra note 35.
178. Other scholars have likewise recognized and endeavored “to bring attention to . . .
[the] rapidly emerging dissonance between the letter of the federal law and bioethical
concerns [including duties to return results] . . . .” Fatehi & Hall, supra note 68, at 598.
179. See supra Section II.A.
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In turn, policy makers could incorporate the consensus norms
that develop, at least to the modest extent of permitting the return
of results whenever the consensus norms recommend disclosure.180
In this way, the law would incorporate ethical standards in a
“gentle” way, making room for optimal ethical conduct without
necessarily compelling it. Although law and policy often
incorporate consensus standards more aggressively, the context of
human subjects research might call for a more gentle incorporation
at least for now, given the risks to research that increased legal
requirements pose, as well as the dynamic nature of health-relevant
results and the inevitable vagueness surrounding the concept.181
Under my proposal—which at this point is preliminary and
provisional, with important details remaining to be worked out—
researchers would at the least be legally permitted to disclose
results whenever disclosure is ethically appropriate. Policy makers
180. The law incorporates extralegal norms in various ways. In the regulatory context, the
incorporation is often done “by reference,” meaning that the standards are not directly included
in the regulation. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (permitting incorporation by reference); 1 C.F.R. § 51 (2020)
(providing instructions for agencies to incorporate standards by reference). See also Nina A.
Mendelson, Public Access to the Law Must Be Taken More Seriously, REGUL. REV. (Jan. 28, 2015),
https://www.theregreview.org/2015/01/28/mendelson-public-access/
(explaining
how
“[a]gencies have incorporated—but only by reference—over 9,000 privately drafted standards
into binding law”); Emily S. Bremer, Incorporation by Reference in an Open-Government Age, 36
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 131, 134 (2013) [hereinafter Bremer, Incorporation by Reference] (“Originally
intended to reduce the size and improve the readability of the CFR, incorporation by reference has
taken on greater significance as the government has embraced the use of voluntary consensus
standards in federal regulations.”). In some contexts, federal law and policy even “require[]
agencies to use these privately developed standards instead of creating ‘government unique’
standards solely to serve regulatory purposes.” Emily S. Bremer, New Rules on Incorporated
Standards Encourage Necessary Public-Private Collaboration, THE REGUL. REV. (Jan. 27, 2015),
https://www.theregreview.org/2015/01/27/bremer-public-private-collab/ [hereinafter Bremer,
New Rules on Incorporated Standards]. In a different way, the common law also incorporates
professional consensus norms. In the medical malpractice context, for example, physicians are
held to the standards of the medical profession. This gives rise to legitimate conflicts of interest
concerns, however. For this reason, it is important that norm development in human subjects
research not be left to researchers alone, who have a self‑interest in minimizing financial and
administrative costs of research, and that bioethicists and others collaborate with researchers to
develop consensus standards. Such consensus standards should be developed through an open
and transparent process and should take into account and balance diverse interests. For good
reason, these criteria are among the requirements of consensus standards incorporated by
reference in regulations. See Bremer, Incorporation by Reference, supra, at 134. For a critical discussion
of the use of practitioner norms in tort standards for professional conduct, see Megan S. Wright,
Nina Varsava, Joel Ramirez, Kyle Edwards, Nathan Guevremont, Tamar Ezer & Joseph J. Fins,
Severe Brain Injury, Disability, and the Law: Achieving Justice for a Marginalized Population, 45 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 313, 368–70 (2018).
181. For a discussion of these risks to research, see supra note 147 and accompanying text.
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would not be directly responsible for coming up with provisions
concerning just which results ought to be returned and in
what manner, and experts and stakeholders would have even
more reason to collaborate in the development of careful
recommendations concerning the return of results and to
disseminate those recommendations broadly.182
Some commentators have proposed that research entities “could
establish a specialized committee separate from the IRB” to decide
which results warrant return; and indeed, some biobanks have done
so.183 Other commentators recommend that “a national body of
scientists can review current genetic knowledge and create uniform
standards” regarding which results ought to be disclosed.184 So far
so good. But the guidance literature needs to commit much greater
attention to the non-ideal consent context—situations in which
participants did not consent to receive results in advance as well
as cases of non-consensual research and research based on
broad‑consent, where participants may not even be aware of their
participation in a study. These are not unusual or special
circumstances.185 It is not enough, then, to assume or hope that
researchers will obtain consent to the return of results in advance.
We have to acknowledge that they do not do so and develop our
recommendations concerning the return of results with that reality
in mind. Here I have argued that researchers should offer
some individual results uncovered in the course of research to
participants, even if participants did not consent up front to the
disclosure. I have not attempted to determine, however, precisely
which results warrant return and what procedures researchers
should follow when returning results.

182. The value of this kind of partnership between government agencies and
nongovernmental actors is well recognized in the law, policy, and scholarship on the
incorporation of standards by reference. See, e.g., Bremer, New Rules on Incorporated Standards,
supra note 180 (observing that this approach to rulemaking “has a variety of benefits and has
facilitated a highly valuable public-private partnership in standards-setting”). The idea of
incorporating consensus ethical norms into the human subjects research regulations, even in
the “gentle” way that I propose, raises some critical questions that are beyond the scope of
this Article, including how to ensure adequate participation and notice.
183. Maschke, supra note 45, at 569.
184. Matthew J. Piehl, The Brave New World of Genetic Biobanks: International Lessons for
a Potential United States Biobank, 46 VAL. U. L. REV. 69, 100 (2011).
185. See supra Section II.A.
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This Article has laid the groundwork for guidance that would
address situations in which participants did not consent to the
return of results in advance and has shown why such guidance is
necessary. The bioethics literature needs to give greater attention to
the rights and interests of these participants. The regulations
should respond accordingly, making space for the ethical return of
results in non-ideal consent scenarios.
CONCLUSION
I have argued that researchers have compelling moral reasons
to return results even in contexts where participants did not
consent in advance to receive them. This argument fills a gap in the
scholarly literature and moreover exposes serious, but remediable,
deficiencies in the regulations governing human subjects research
and the implementation of those regulations. The law and policy
governing human subjects research discourage researchers from
returning results to participants and make it especially unlikely
that researchers will return results in the event that they did not
obtain consent to the return in advance. This represents a major
shortcoming in the law and policy landscape.
The Common Rule purports to be grounded in insights from
bioethics, and specifically in the fundamental bioethics principles
of respect for persons, beneficence, and justice.186 By allowing for
research without informed consent and imposing no requirements
on researchers to return results, the regulations facilitate the
efficient use of participants in the research enterprise. But insofar
as they prohibit or discourage the return of results, the regulations
show insufficient respect for the participants on which the research
enterprise critically depends.
This Article has addressed some major bioethical and legal
questions, but it has also left several collateral questions
unanswered. Exactly which results qualify as health-relevant for the
purposes of ethical disclosure? And how should researchers disclose
such results to participants? Should they perform the disclosure
themselves, or delegate the task to a third party? What kind of
186. See The Common Rule preamble, explaining that the regulations seek to serve the
ethical principles articulated in the Belmont Report. 45 C.F.R. § 46.101 (2020). For example,
“[d]epartment or agency heads retain final judgment as to whether a particular activity is
covered by this policy and this judgment shall be exercised consistent with the ethical
principles of the Belmont Report.” Id. § 46.101(c).
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information and guidance should be offered to participants in
addition to health-relevant results?187 These are important
questions, but they will have to await future research, and are best
addressed by multidisciplinary groups comprised of legal scholars,
bioethicists, biomedical researchers, geneticists, physicians, and
research participants themselves.
Scholars addressing duties to return results have often
presupposed an ideal consent setting, and have neglected difficult
but pressing questions about how researchers should handle
individual results when consent is lacking or otherwise deficient.
The existing related literature thus does not sufficiently attend to
the rights and interests of participants who did not consent up
front to the return of results. The regulations do not help matters.
In multiple ways, they discourage researchers from disclosing
results if participants were not given the opportunity up front to
consent to the disclosure. The rules thus disserve a critical group
of research participants. This Article contributes to the law, policy,
and ethics literature by addressing researcher responsibilities to
return results in non-ideal consent settings; by illuminating
related limitations with the regulations, which create obstacles to
disclosing results to participants even when researchers may have
moral obligations to do so; and by proposing a provisional path
to remedy the problem presented.
The law should not prohibit or discourage investigators from
returning individual health-relevant findings to those affected by
them—certainly not in public health emergencies such as the
outbreak of COVID-19 in the United States, but not under normal
circumstances either. The COVID-19 example shows just how high
and urgent the stakes can be. But we should treat it as a lesson in the

187. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 35, at 230 (observing that, “because genetic
information is seen as weightier and harder to understand [than other types of health
information], disclosure without accompanying genetic counseling is widely considered
ethically problematic”); Renegar et al., supra note 41, at 34 (recommending that those
“responsible for communicating the genetic results to participants should” be
knowledgeable about “the genetic science associated with the study . . .[,] [a]ppreciate the
potential social and psychological impact on the individual . . .[,] [c]ommunicate . . . about
the study results effectively[,]” and “[k]now when and how to refer participants for
additional care and/or information”); see also RICHARDSON, supra note 165 (arguing that
researchers have duties not only to return results in certain contexts but also to provide some
related, or “ancillary,” care).
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value of disclosing results and not as an exception to an otherwise
desirable rule against disclosure in the absence of consent.
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